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Abstract
We study the causal effect of school curricula on students’ political attitudes, exploiting a major
textbook reform in China between 2004 and 2010. The sharp, staggered introduction of the new
curriculum across provinces allows us to identify its causal effects. We examine government
documents articulating desired consequences of the reform, and identify changes in textbooks
reflecting these aims. A survey we conducted reveals that the reform was often successful
in shaping attitudes, while evidence on behavior is mixed. Studying the new curriculum led
to more positive views of China’s governance, changed views on democracy, and increased
skepticism toward free markets.
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1 Introduction
Beliefs, attitudes, and ideology play a fundamental role in human societies: they shape interac-
tions within social networks and in markets; they underlie political institutions and policy choices.
People’s attitudes are formed by a variety of sources: they are transmitted from parents to chil-
dren; from peer to peer; from third parties, such as media, experts, or the state; and, they arise
from individual experiences.1 The influence of education on attitudes has also been widely stud-
ied across the social sciences, but without an established body of clear, causal evidence of its
effects.
In this paper, we use evidence from a survey we conducted with nearly 2,000 Peking Univer-
sity undergraduate students to study the causal effect of school curricula on students’ political
attitudes and beliefs, examining the impact of a new high school Politics curriculum that was in-
troduced by the Chinese Communist Party between 2004 and 2010 with the explicit intention of
shaping students’ ideology. The State Council (the highest administrative body in the Chinese
government) and the Ministry of Education issued documents articulating the government’s ob-
jectives for the new curriculum: among these were emphasizing the adherence of the Chinese
government to the rule of law; teaching students about Chinese socialist democratic institutions;
teaching students about China’s unique economic institutions and development path; cultivating
in students a traditional national identity that bridged ethnic groups; and, promoting increased
concern for the environment.
The curriculum reform we study offers a particularly promising setting in which to estimate
the causal effect of educational content on students’ beliefs and attitudes. Between 2004 and 2010,
the new curriculum (the “8th Curriculum Reform”) was sharply introduced to entering cohorts of
high school students (but not to older students) in a staggered manner, with different provinces
adopting the new curriculum in different years. Using our survey, we confirm that students stud-
ied the intended textbooks: nearly 95% of students identify the textbook cover we predict given
their home province and high school entry date. In addition, we find that the changes in the
textbooks’ content are reflected in students’ factual knowledge.
The primary purpose of our survey was to elicit students’ political attitudes and beliefs. We
specifically asked students questions in a manner that did not look like a series of examination
questions, and the pattern of responses does not look like what one would expect if students’
responses simply reflected what they believed to be “correct” answers. Our survey allows us to
measure the political attitudes and beliefs of four cohorts of Chinese students, who entered high
1Parent-child transmission has received considerable attention, for example Bisin and Verdier (2001). Peers’ influ-
ence on beliefs has been studied by Sacerdote (2001) and Sacerdote (2011), among others. Stro¨mberg (2004), DellaVigna
and Kaplan (2007), DellaVigna et al. (2014), and Shapiro (2014) study the influence of the media on political views;
Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln (2007) study the effects of growing up in a Communist system on policy preferences later
in life. Di Tella, Galiani, and Schargrodsky (2007), Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2013), Malmendier and Nagel (2011), and
Rao (2013) study the role of individuals’ experiences in shaping attitudes and beliefs.
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school between 2006 and 2009, drawn from 29 Chinese provinces.
We apply a generalized difference in differences framework to test whether students who stud-
ied under the new curriculum express different political attitudes from those who studied under
the old curriculum. To derive hypotheses, we carefully examine government documents detail-
ing the goals of the reform, and we compare the old and new versions of the textbooks, both
qualitatively and quantitatively (through word frequencies). We identify five broad categories of
attitudes the government wished to affect: (i) views on governance; (ii) views on Chinese political
institutions; (iii) views on economic institutions; (iv) students’ views on Chinese identity; and, (v) at-
titudes toward the environment;. In addition to studying the effect of the new curriculum on these
attitudes, we also study (vi) behavior related to the attitudes we examine (specifically, self-reported
political behavior, economic choices, and past cooperation with Chinese ethnic minorities).
We find that the new curriculum was often successful in changing students’ attitudes on im-
portant issues, in the direction intended by the Chinese government. Regarding governance, stu-
dents exposed to the new curriculum have greater trust in government officials, view government
officials as more civic-minded, and see bribery as less prevalent and effective. With respect to
political institutions, students exposed to the new curriculum see China as more democratic, and
view individuals’ political participation as a defining characteristic of democracy, but are more
skeptical of unconstrained democracy—precisely the message conveyed by the new curriculum
(and matching the government’s aim of teaching students about “socialist democracy”). Finally,
students exposed to the new curriculum express more skeptical views of unconstrained free mar-
kets, again matching the content of the new curriculum and the government’s aim of teaching
students about Chinese (as opposed to Western, free-market) economic institutions.
On the other hand, we do not find statistically significant effects for some of the attitudes that
we examine. As desired by the government, students express somewhat more “multi-ethnic”
views of Chinese national identity, and also express a somewhat stronger sense of their own na-
tional identity, though these effects are not statistically significant. The new curriculum did not
cause students to favor policies protecting the environment. In fact, attitudes move in the oppo-
site direction of what the government intended, perhaps because environmental protection can be
seen as opposed to economic growth—another high priority.
We also surveyed students regarding their engagement in behavior related to the attitudes that
the government wished to shape. Here our results are mixed: students exposed to the new cur-
riculum engage in significantly less risky investment activity (investing in stocks and bonds), con-
sistent with viewing markets with more skepticism. Studying the new curriculum is not associ-
ated with significantly different rates of cooperating with ethnic minorities, which is consistent
with students not reporting a significantly more expansive sense of their national identity. In the
political institutions dimension, we find that students exposed to the new curriculum engage in
slightly more political activity (such as voting/planning to vote, and participating in political or-
ganizations), but the difference between their behavior and that of students exposed to the old
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curriculum is not statistically significant. This stands in contrast to the highly significant differ-
ences in views on Chinese governance and political institutions.
The statistically insignificant effects of the new curriculum on political behavior may, in part,
reflect Peking University students’ very constrained opportunities to engage in political behavior.2
In Section 5, we examine the association between stated attitudes and reported political behavior
in the Asian Barometer Survey, a broader sample with an older population. In the Asian Barom-
eter sample, we indeed find a statistically significant relationship between stated trust in local
government officials and political behavior: more trust is associated with less participation in
demonstrations and less refusal to pay taxes. While this evidence is merely suggestive, the greater
trust in government officials that we attribute to the new curriculum may reduce anti-government
behavior among affected students in the decades ahead.
Our findings contribute to a vast social science literature on the ability of educational content
to shape individuals’ beliefs, preferences and political ideology. Prior work ranges across cen-
turies and continents—from studies of the construction of a “national sentiment” through public
schooling in 19th century Prussia and France (Weber, 1976) to studies of American schools in the
19th and 20th centuries (Dewey, 1916; Lipset, 1959; Freire, 1970; Bowles and Gintis, 1976), and
Communist and Socialist education in the second half of the 20th century (Lott, Jr., 1999).3 Despite
striking examples of schooling changes being associated with ideological changes (e.g., education
in Nazi Germany), it is difficult to determine whether schooling plays a causal role in shaping be-
liefs or if, instead, changes in curriculum simply coincide with other social, political, or economic
changes which themselves shape preferences.
Recently, scholars have begun making progress toward identifying the causal effect of educa-
tion on political attitudes and ideology. Friedman et al. (2011) exploit experimental variation in
access to additional schooling on Kenyan women’s political and social views. Their work identi-
fies an effect of schooling on attitudes, but does not identify the effects of particular educational
content on attitudes. In a study of the impact of Catalan education on political attitudes, Clots-
Figueras and Masella (2013) exploit variation that is similar to ours—cohort-varying exposure to
new educational content—but they lack the sharp variation in educational content across cohorts
that we can exploit, and they also lack credible cross-sectional variation with which to address
concerns about unobservable cross-cohort differences. Their work also studies the combined effect
of changes in the language of instruction with changes in content, in a context of broad political
change.
By examining sharp province×cohort variation in school curricula, we can plausibly identify
the causal effect of educational content on attitudes and ideology. Specifically, our identification
2For example, Beijing (the place of residence of all of our surveyed students) last held a People’s Congress election in
2011; thus, freshmen in our sample, who entered university in 2012, had no opportunity to vote in Beijing—and likely
no opportunity to vote in their previous place of residence given their age.
3See also Kremer and Sarychev (1998), Gradstein and Justman (2002, 2005), Spilimbergo (2009), Friedman et al.
(2011), Campante and Chor (2012), Alesina and Reich (2013), and Bandiera et al. (2015).
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strategy allows us to rule out as confounding factors: (i) province-specific differences (e.g., lev-
els of development); (ii) cohort-specific differences (e.g., broad changes in attitudes across time);
(iii) province×time varying shocks that affect adjacent cohorts similarly (e.g., natural disasters
or province-level political shocks that do not differentially affect children of different ages); and
(iv) province×time varying shocks that affect adjacent cohorts differentially, but smoothly (e.g.,
province-specific trends in economic activity), in a specification that includes province-specific
cross-cohort trends. We also implement a variety of techniques (following Anderson, 2008) to
address concerns regarding statistical inference, given that we test multiple hypotheses.
Beyond identifying the causal effect of typically endogenous curriculum change, our particular
setting is of great interest. The variation in educational content we observe is naturally occurring,
introduced on a massive scale by an authoritarian state that explicitly aimed to shape students’
views. Whether the Chinese government can shape the political attitudes of Chinese children is
difficult to know ex ante: on the one hand, the Chinese government is greatly concerned with in-
formation control; it seems to be very effective in implementing policies across many domains; in
addition, Chinese children spend a great deal of their time in school, absorbing information on
which they will be tested. On the other hand, students know that the Communist Party dissem-
inates information (school curricula and media) in part driven by political concerns. One might
believe that students will thus view the official curriculum with skepticism—or even react nega-
tively against it.4 The new curriculum might also fail to persuade students because the internet
allows students to easily access content that differs from official Party positions.5 Thus, an im-
portant question in the internet age is whether school curricula can affect ideology even when
students know that their curriculum may be shaped by political concerns, and when students
have access to information that differs from the party line.
Our finding that China’s Communist Party successfully shaped students’ views contributes to
a growing empirical literature on persuasion (DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2010), much of which
has focused on the persuasive effects of media communications (Stro¨mberg, 2004; DellaVigna and
Kaplan, 2007; Bursztyn and Cantoni, 2012; Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014; DellaVigna et al., 2014). Re-
cent work has focused on attempts by authoritarian regimes to shape the views of their citizens
(Alesina and Reich, 2013), to which we contribute a study of the role of educational content in
shaping political attitudes. Our findings suggest that alongside other mechanisms of social and
political control, political elites can shape students’ attitudes by choosing the content of the edu-
cation system.
The paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, we discuss China’s 8th Curriculum Reform, which
is the focus of our study; we identify specific attitudes the Chinese government wished to shape,
and present qualitative and quantitative evidence of changes in textbook content that reflect the
4Fouka (2014) presents evidence that government policies aimed to promote cultural assimilation among German-
Americans in the United States in the early 20th century backfired.
5Edmond (2013) models sophisticated consumers of potentially-biased government media, and emphasizes the im-
portance of media centralization for the government’s ability to control information and prevent revolt.
4
Chinese government’s aims. In Section 3, we describe our survey of Peking University students,
which is our primary data source, and discuss our approach to statistical inference. In Section 4,
we present our empirical model and our main results. In Section 5, we provide a discussion
of robustness, economic magnitudes, and external validity. Finally, in Section 6, we place our
findings within the social science literature on the effects of schooling on political beliefs and
attitudes, and conclude.
2 China’s curriculum reform
We study China’s 8th Curriculum Reform, a nationwide education reform undertaken by the Chi-
nese central government beginning in 2001.6 The curriculum reform was described by govern-
ment officials as “historically important,” and among the most significant changes in educational
policy since China’s economic reforms.7 Our focus will be the reformed textbooks of senior high
school (gaozhong xinkebiao) students, corresponding to grades 10–12 in the Chinese educational
system.8
2.1 The introduction of the new curriculum across space and time
The mode of introduction of the revised curriculum makes China’s curriculum reform an es-
pecially promising context in which to study the causal effect of a change in curriculum. Be-
tween 2004 and 2010, different Chinese provinces, in different years, introduced new high school
curricula and textbooks for incoming cohorts of senior high school students. Students entering
high school one year would have an entirely different three-year curriculum from that of students
who entered high school just the year before. Students in the older, pre-reform cohort would not
be “partially treated” because the college entrance exam was based either on the old curriculum
or on the new one.9
The first entering cohorts to study under the new curriculum were students entering high
school in 2004 (graduating in 2007) in the provinces of Shandong, Ningxia, Hainan, and Guang-
dong. Over the next six years, every other province except Shanghai saw the introduction of the
new textbooks, with Guangxi, Sichuan, Guizhou, Qinghai, and Tibet finally introducing the new
6The previous, 7th curriculum reform was initiated in 1992.
7The quote comes from Muju Zhu, Vice Chief at the Basic Education Bureau, Ministry of Education of China. See
Zhao, Hongtao (2007), “High School Curriculum Reform is a Historically-Important Mission”, available at: http://
goo.gl/Xf2jlX, last accessed June 27, 2015. Tao Qi, Minster of Education of Shandong Province, placed the curriculum
reform alongside reform of the job allocation system for college graduates as the most important educational policy
changes in the post-economic reform era. See Song, Quanzheng (2004), “High School Curriculum Reform, the Earlier
the Better—Minister of Education Tao Qi Discussing the Curriculum Reform,” available at http://goo.gl/81F7ND, last
accessed June 27, 2015.
8For reference, in Appendix A, we briefly describe the structure of the Chinese high school curriculum.
9While students in different school cohorts may interact, in Chinese high schools the vast majority of a student’s
time is spent with other students in the same cohort; thus, there is limited potential for “contamination” of the old
curriculum students by those treated by the new curriculum.
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curriculum to entering high school students in 2010 (graduating in 2013). The introduction dates
by province are presented in Figure 1.10
It is worth stressing that the introduction date of the new curriculum was not randomly as-
signed across provinces. Provinces introduced the new curriculum when they had successfully
trained teachers and developed supplemental materials based on the new textbooks. We discuss
how non-random introduction of the new curriculum across provinces affects our identification
of the causal effects of the curriculum below.
2.2 Political aims of curriculum reform
An explicit goal of the 8th Curriculum Reform was to shape (or reshape) students’ political and
social beliefs. In a 2001 document preparing the reform (“Framework for Basic Education Curricu-
lum Reform”), the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China stated that education
should “form in students a correct worldview, a correct view on life, and a correct value system.”11
An author of the new Politics textbooks described the development of the new curriculum as fol-
lows:
The Politics textbook is the spiritual material that the country provides for its students. Writ-
ing the Politics textbook is an act at the state level, rather than an academic activity of the
individual author. Although the high school Politics textbook teaches very basic knowledge, it
possesses extremely strong political, policy-oriented, and scientific characteristics. With a large
readership, it will influence an entire generation of young people.12
While the 8th Curriculum Reform affected the content of textbooks across the high school cur-
riculum (for example, there was an increase in the discussion of Confucianism in the reformed
humanities curriculum), we focus on changes made to the Politics curriculum because it was de-
signed for “moral and ideological education.”13 Indeed, the State Council, China’s chief admin-
istrative authority, issued a memo in 2004 titled “Suggestions on Strengthening the Ideological
10In Appendix B, Table B.1, we provide citations to government documents and official news reports announcing the
introduction of the new curriculum in each province.
11Translated excerpts from this and other official documents preparing the Curriculum Reform are presented in Ap-
pendix C. Along with changes in the content of the curriculum, there was a desire to change the exam-oriented nature
of primary and secondary education through the introduction of new instructional methods. However, this aspect of
the reform is acknowledged to have failed; see, for example, Gua, Hua (2010), “New curriculum and ‘wearing new
shoes to walk on the old path’,” available at http://goo.gl/VFDmwB, last accessed June 27, 2015. We examine changes
in instructional methods across curricula in further detail in Section 5.
12Appendix B includes this and other translated excerpts from an essay written by Tian Xinming, chair of the com-
mittee in charge of rewriting the Politics textbook. The original text can be found at http://www.pep.com.cn/sxzz/
js/tbjx/kb/jsys/bx1/201008/t20100830\_824446.htm, last accessed February 9, 2014.
13See Appendix B for translated excerpts from the essay written by the chair of the committee in charge of rewrit-
ing the Politics textbook (original text at http://www.pep.com.cn/sxzz/js/tbjx/kb/jsys/bx1/201008/t20100830\
_824446.htm, last accessed February 9, 2014). Chinese high school students specialize in either a science track or a
humanities track, with students in both tracks studying the Politics material on which we focus. While the Politics
material is higher-stakes for humanities track students, students in both tracks are tested on it as part of the college
entrance process. We find similar effects of the new curriculum for the two tracks (see Section 5); our baseline analysis
pools students from the two tracks.
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and Moral Construction of Our Youths,” which articulated the government’s aims for the reform,
and guided the writing of the new Politics textbooks. The memo declared the socialization of
young people to be an “important and urgent strategic task,” and saw schools as “the primary
channel for transmitting ideological and moral education to young people.”14 We consulted the
State Council memo, several other government documents, as well as the Ministry of Education’s
“Curriculum Framework for the Senior High School Politics Subject” to identify the government’s
objectives for the curriculum reform (these documents are described in Appendix C).
2.3 Changes in textbook content and the gaokao: qualitative evidence
To identify specific changes in the Politics curriculum content that matched the government’s ob-
jectives, we first performed a comprehensive comparison of the old and new editions of the Eco-
nomic Life and Political Life textbooks.15 The Politics textbooks (unlike other subjects) are common
to all provinces of China except Shanghai—one set for the old curriculum and one set for the new
curriculum—greatly simplifying our analysis, and reducing concern about endogenous variation
in textbook content. While much of the textbooks’ content was maintained across curricula, some
content changed considerably.
We identified sections that were entirely new to the reformed textbooks, sections that were
removed from the old textbooks, and sections that were extensively revised. We also examined
variation in the material on which students were tested in China’s high-stakes college entrance
exam (gaokao). Specifically, we compared the gaokao frameworks across curricula to confirm that
the framework associated with the new curriculum incorporated the revisions, additions, and
deletions of the new curriculum in a manner that matches changes in the textbook content that
we identified.16 Indeed, for all of the textbook content changes on which we focus, we find corre-
sponding changes in the gaokao framework; this is prima facie evidence that the changes in content
would have been important to teachers and students.
It is clear from our analysis that several sets of striking curriculum changes were consistent
with the objectives outlined in the government documents. These changes fit into five broad cate-
gories of political attitudes that the Chinese government wished to change: (i) views on governance;
14The document is available online at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jiaoyu/1053/2405224.html, last accessed
February 9, 2014. See Appendix C for translated excerpts.
15These textbooks made up two-thirds of the old Politics curriculum and half of the new Politics curriculum. The
old curriculum included a Philosophy textbook, and the new curriculum includes both Philosophy and Cultural Life.
We felt that the Philosophy textbook was too nebulous to systematically link to the political objectives of the Chinese
government, and the Cultural Life textbook could not be compared across curricula. We do examine the content of
the Cultural Life textbook in our quantitative textual analysis, below. Images of the covers of old and new Politics
curriculum textbooks can be seen in Appendix B.2.
16Carnoy et al. (2013, ch. 6) describe the importance of the gaokao and the gaokao framework (or “syllabi”) as follows:
“[T]he college entrance exam in China is a two-day high stakes test whose score largely determines into which college
and major a student will be admitted. . . . Moreover, the curriculum in Chinese academic high schools is heavily struc-
tured around the college entrance exam. This is because most provinces in China release syllabi to high school teachers
about what will generally be covered on each year’s (provincial-level) exam.”
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(ii) views on Chinese political institutions; (iii) views on economic institutions; (iv) students’ views
on Chinese identity; and, (v) attitudes toward the environment. Here we describe the qualitative
evidence of textbook changes matching the government’s desired attitude changes.17
Governance It is clear from the government documents on curriculum reform that a high pri-
ority was to teach students about institutions that legitimized the Chinese government and its
officials, especially adherence to rule of law. Reflecting this aim, the new curriculum’s Political
Life textbook includes an added section titled, “Where does government’s authority come from?”
which states (p. 49):
Where does the Chinese government’s authority manifest itself? A government with authority
must be a government under the rule of law. It guards the ultimate authority of the constitution
and the legal system, and hence protects people’s fundamental rights and benefits.
The new curriculum’s gaokao framework reflects the changes to the textbook, with added sec-
tions in the Political Life module on “the functions and duty of the Chinese government”, “the
principles of the Chinese government”, and “the significance and necessity of rule of law”.
Political institutions The Chinese government’s documents on curriculum reform also empha-
size teaching students about “socialist democracy”. This notion of democracy is more limited
than the Western concept: it involves the participation of citizens while maintaining the political
status quo of one-party rule (Brady, 2008). Reflecting this, the new Political Life textbook includes
entirely new sections on political participation and electoral institutions. Some of these are de-
scriptive, providing information on voting for offices such as Village Head and People’s Congress
Representative. Others are prescriptive; importantly, the new curriculum does not simply advo-
cate unfettered political expression and action—it highlights the institutions allowing for political
participation in China, while drawing a clear distinction between orderly and disorderly civil par-
ticipation.
For example, the Political Life textbook, pp. 17–18, includes a new section titled, “Cherish your
voting rights,” which states:
Citizens have to continue improving themselves in participating in democratic elections, so
that they can exercise their voting rights well. Only then can citizens be able to better manage
China’s national and social affairs, as well as its economic and cultural matters.
A bit further into the Political Life textbook, there is another new section titled, “Orderly and
disorderly political participation,” which states that orderly political participation depends on
(p. 30):
17In Appendix D, we present an item-by-item discussion of each of these government aims: we point to their dis-
cussion in government documents; we identify changes in the Politics textbooks that match the government objectives;
and, we describe changes in the gaokao framework that match the objectives as well.
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whether citizens can correctly handle the relationship between their political rights and politi-
cal duties. As long as we are under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, following
the constitution, laws and regulations, we can ensure orderly political participation. Without
the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, violation of laws, regulations, and procedures
will inevitably lead to disorderly participation.
The new sections in the textbook are reflected in the gaokao framework for the new curricu-
lum, as well. The framework includes the following new modules in the Political Life component:
“Channels for Chinese citizens’ participation in political life”; “Multiple ways for citizens to par-
ticipate in democratic decision-making”; “The meaning and significance of China’s villages and
urban dwellers governing themselves”; and, “Citizens need to realize their democratic supervis-
ing rights responsibly”.
Economic institutions Government documents shaping the new curriculum emphasized the
importance of the “socialist market economy” (as opposed to a free market economy) for eco-
nomic and social development. In the new Economic Life textbook, many sections emphasize the
“socialist market economy,” in which markets are complemented or corrected by state or socialist
institutions. For example, the important role of state-owned enterprises is made clear in the new
curriculum’s Economic Life textbook (p. 31):
Just like the pillars that support skyscrapers, state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) are the backbone
of China’s domestic economy. They control the life vessels of the economic system, and play a
vital and leading role in the system. To develop, expand and strengthen the SOEs is of critical
importance, to demonstrate the superiority of socialist system, to strengthen China’s economic
power, national defense power, as well as ethnic unity. They can also elevate the international
position of China.
Social inequality—a major threat to Chinese political and social stability—is explicitly linked
to market institutions. The new Economic Life textbook (p. 81) states:
[A]llowing markets alone to allocate resources will lead to inefficiency and waste, as well as
socioeconomic instability. Market functioning alone can also result in economic fluctuations
and chaos, unfair redistribution, widening income gaps, and even cause severe polarization.
Many changes in the gaokao framework also emphasize the important role played by the state
in the economic system. In the Economic Life section of the framework, new sections include “sus-
tainable and balanced economic development;” “public-ownership structure should play a major
role;” and, “multiple ownership structures develop simultaneously.”
Identity The Chinese government made it a high priority to cultivate a “national spirit” encom-
passing both the majority Han Chinese and the minority ethnic groups in China. The new Political
Life textbook adds (p. 72) an entire section titled “Principles of dealing with relationships among
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ethnic groups: equality, unity, joint prosperity.” The new Cultural Life textbook adds two sections
(pp. 71–81) titled: “The Eternal Chinese Ethnic Spirit” and “Promoting the Chinese Ethnic Spirit.”
The emphasis on ethnic and national pride and unity in the new curriculum is striking: the new
curriculum’s Political Life textbook (p. 75) states:
It is every Chinese citizen’s responsibility to abide by the Constitutional duty that one has to
guard national and ethnic unity and harmony. As a youth in China today, we need to put our
responsibility to develop Socialist multi-ethnic harmony into action.
The new curriculum’s Cultural Life textbook (pp. 71–72) includes:
The power of the Chinese civilization is primarily manifested by the power of the Chinese eth-
nic spirit. . . . [A]fter five thousand years of development, the Chinese ethnic group has formed
a great ethnic spirit centered around patriotism, and encompassing unity, peace, diligence,
bravery, and perseverance.
The new curriculum’s gaokao framework also added new sections regarding Chinese ethnic
unity: “promote Chinese ethnic spirit” and, “the core of Chinese ethnic spirit.”
Environment Government documents structuring the curriculum reform mention conscious-
ness of the environment as a value that ought to be instilled in Chinese students. The new Eco-
nomic Life textbook includes a new section titled, “Establishing the correct view on consumption”,
which states (p. 22):
We should protect the environment and consume “green.” Facing a severe shortage in re-
sources, and environmental pollution, we should establish an attitude of environmental friend-
liness, and maintain the harmony between people and nature.
The new curriculum’s gaokao framework includes new sections in the Economic Life module ti-
tled “scientific outlook on development” and “sustainable and balanced economic development”,
which include discussions of environmental issues.
2.4 Changes in textbook content and the gaokao: quantitative evidence
In addition to our qualitative analysis of the textbooks’ content, we conducted a quantitative anal-
ysis of the text in the old and new Politics curricula.18 To structure our analysis, we searched
for each word contained in the Chinese State Council document, “Suggestions on Strengthening
the Ideological and Moral Construction of Our Youths,” which outlined the government’s objec-
tives for the reform. For each word, we calculated the frequency of that word in the old Politics
18We digitized and examined the Economic Basics (10th grade module A) and Political Basics (10th grade module B)
texts for the old curriculum and the Economic Life, Political Life, and Cultural Life texts for the new curriculum.
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textbooks and the new. We also refine our search for words, manually identifying 67 out of the
1,166 words within the State Council document that match our five broad categories of interest.19
For comparison, we also search for the 1,166 most frequent words in the Chinese language, taken
from the Modern Chinese Frequency Dictionary (Beijing Language College and Language Educa-
tion Research Institute, 1985), and again calculate the frequency of each word in the old and new
textbooks.
In Figure 2, we present the cumulative distribution functions of the percentage change in the
frequency of words across curricula, for three sets of words: the full set of government docu-
ment words, the subset of government document words that match our five main attitudes of
interest, and the dictionary words. One can see in the figure that the words present in the govern-
ment document increase in frequency systematically more than the comparison dictionary words.
Moreover, the words linked to our five broad categories of interest show much greater increases in
frequency than the other government document words—again, this is seen across the distribution
of words.
In addition to examining the full set of 67 words in the government document that were related
to the five categories of attitude change we identified as government objectives, it is of interest
to focus on key terms in the government document most closely linked to these attitudes. In
Table 1, Panel A, we present counts and the percentage change in frequency of two “key words”
for each category of attitudes that we examine. One can see that these key words are typically
associated with unusually large increases in frequency. The one exception is “market economy”,
which decreases in frequency. This change, and the very large increase in frequency of the term
“Socialism with Chinese characteristics”, reflect the more negative treatment of markets in the
new textbooks.
We also show in Table 1, Panel B, the counts and changes in frequency of: (i) two political
terms that are not focused on by the Chinese government; (ii) two “neutral” (non-political) words;
and (iii) “Hu Jintao” and “Jiang Zemin”, two presidents of China who held office during the
curriculum reform process, but whose names were never mentioned in the old curriculum. One
can see that the changes in frequency we found for the five attitudes of interest are large relative
to these “comparison” words.
Our quantitative analysis thus confirms our conclusions from reading the Politics textbooks
and examining the gaokao frameworks: the language used in the State Council document is far
more prevalent in the new curriculum than the old, and the specific concepts on which we focused
our qualitative discussion show even sharper changes in prevalence across curricula.
19In Appendix C.3, we present the full list of these words that match the government objectives on which we focus.
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3 Survey of Peking University students
We measure students’ beliefs using a web-based survey we conducted April and May 2013 (the
entire set of survey questions is provided in Appendix E). We sent an email invitation to par-
ticipate in the survey to the complete email list of undergraduate students at Peking University;
students were offered payment for their participation, and were included in a raffle for a number
of desirable Apple-brand electronics. We received nearly 2,000 completed surveys, for a response
rate of around 18.6% of the undergraduate population of Peking University. Participants were
paid an average of 58 RMB ($9.50), and were awarded multiple iPads and iPods.20
3.1 Survey questions measuring political attitudes and behavior
We study six broad categories of outcomes from among the larger set of survey questions: re-
sponses to survey questions regarding the five categories of political attitudes that the Chinese
government aimed to shape (discussed in detail above), and questions eliciting self-reported be-
havior linked to these attitudes.21 Within the six broad categories, we organize survey questions
into sub-categories where appropriate. We always code the responses to these questions such that
the Chinese government’s desired attitudes are assigned larger, more positive numbers.
The specific survey questions eliciting our outcome variables are shown in the following table:
Category: Governance
Panel A: Trust in government officials
A.1–6 Describe your level of trust in the following institutions: (1 = complete distrust; 5 = complete
trust)
A.1 Central government
A.2 Provincial government
A.3 Local government
A.4 Courts
A.5 Armed forces
A.6 Police
Panel B: Bribery and civic-mindedness
B.1 Village heads put their own interest before those of people. (1 = fully agree; 5 = fully disagree)
B.2 Village heads care primarily about the powerful and rich people, and neglect the interests of
ordinary people. (1 = fully agree; 5 = fully disagree)
Continued on next page
20The survey’s content and implementation procedure were approved by the UC-Berkeley Committee for Protec-
tion of Human Subjects, Protocol ID 2012-05-4323. The recruitment email (in Chinese and in English translation), a
screenshot from the survey, and an image of an iPad winner are all provided in Appendix E.
21In addition to the survey questions studied as outcomes, the survey included questions on students’ personal
backgrounds (which we use to test for balance across curricula and as controls in our robustness analysis); questions
on students’ perceptions of teaching practices (which we examine in Section 5); questions regarding political attitudes
not discussed in government documents related to the curriculum reform (discussed in Appendix E and Appendix F);
and, questions about attitudes and beliefs outside the political realm (again, discussed in Appendix E and Appendix
F). The latter categories were included in the survey as part of a broader study of China’s elite.
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B.3–7 In your opinion, how often is it necessary for people like you to have to make unofficial pay-
ments/gifts in these situations: (1= always; 5=never)
B.3 Interacting with the traffic police?
B.4 Requesting official documents (such as passport or birth certificate)?
B.5 Interacting with the civil courts?
B.6 Interacting with the providers of primary or secondary education?
B.7 Interacting with doctors?
B.8 Do you think that paying a bribe is an acceptable way to accomplish something? (1 = no)
B.9 Do you think that paying a bribe is an effective way to accomplish something? (1 = no)
B.10 From the perspective of local government officials, do you think they would accept bribe when it
is offered to them? (1 = no)
Category: Political Institutions
Panel C: Perception of Chinese democracy
C.1 Where would you place our country under the present government? (1 = completely undemo-
cratic; 10 = completely democratic)
C.2 In reality, ordinary people are able to influence who becomes the village head. (1 = totally dis-
agree; 5 = fully agree)
Panel D: Wisdom of the masses
D.1 Ordinary people can judge who would make a better village head. (1 = fully agree; 5 = fully
disagree)
D.2 Theoretically speaking, ordinary people should be able to influence the decision of who becomes
the village head. (1 = fully agree; 5 = fully disagree)
D.3 Ordinary people know clearly which leader is doing a better job. (1 = fully agree; 5 = fully dis-
agree)
D.4 Democracy (choose one): (a) Democracy is preferable to any other form of political system; (b)
Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one;
(c) For people like me, it does not matter whether a government is democratic or authoritarian. (1
= chooses (b) or (c); 0 = otherwise)
D.5 Here is a similar scale of 1 to 10 measuring the extent to which people think democracy is suitable
for our country. If “10” means that democracy is completely unsuitable for China today and “1”
means that it is completely suitable, where would you place our country today?
Panel E: Characteristics of democracy
E.1 Which of the following do you think are characteristics of a democracy? (1 = “People’s participa-
tion in the political process” listed first; 0 = otherwise)
Category: Economic Institutions
Panel F: Skeptical of markets
F.1 From the following statements on a market economy, choose one that you agree with the most:
(a) A market economy is preferable to any other form of economic system; (b) For people like
me, it does not matter whether the economic system is organized as a market economy or as
a planned economy; (c) Under some circumstances, a planned economy may be preferable to a
market economy. (1=chooses (b) or (c); 0=otherwise)
Category: Identity
Panel G: Ethnic identity
Continued on next page
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G.1 Generally speaking, would you say that people in minority groups can be trusted, or that you
cannot be too careful in dealing with them? (1 = cannot be too careful; 5 = completely trustworthy)
G.2 China is a country made up of multiple ethnic groups. Which one of the following statements
regarding ethnic minority groups do you agree with more? (a) Compared to Han Chinese, ethnic
minority groups are relatively independent groups. (coded as 0) (b) Ethnic minority groups are
the same as Han Chinese, and they are all Chinese people. (coded as 1)
G.3 China is a country made up of multiple ethnic groups. Which one of the following statements
regarding ethnic minority groups do you agree with more? (a) Ethnic minority groups share the
same historic heritage and cultural traditions as the Han Chinese. (coded as 1) (b) Ethnic minority
groups have different historic heritage and cultural traditions from the Han Chinese. (coded as 0)
G.4 Can you imagine yourself marrying a member of a different ethnic group in the future? (1 = yes)
Panel H: National identity
H.1 Where would you place your identity on a spectrum, with being Chinese on one end (5) and being
a world citizen on the other end (1)
Category: Environment
Panel I: Attitudes about environment
I.1 Would you be willing to give part of your income or pay more taxes, if you were sure that the
extra money was used to protect the environment? (1 = yes)
I.2 People often talk about what the goals of this country should be for the next ten years. Listed
below are some common goals for a nation. Please pick the one that you consider as primary for
a nation. (a) a high level of economic growth; (b) maintaining economic stability; (c) maintaining
order in the nation; (d) giving people more say in important government decisions; (e) protecting
the environment. (1=chooses (e); 0=otherwise)
I.3 Here are two statements people sometimes make when discussing the environment and economic
growth. Which of them comes closer to your own point of view? (a) Protecting the environment
should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs. (b) Eco-
nomic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to
some extent. (1=chooses (a); 0=otherwise)
Category: Behavior
Panel J: Political behavior
J.1 I have voted for local (county or district) People’s Congress representatives before. (1 = yes)
J.2 I plan to vote for local (county or district) People’s Congress representatives. (1 = yes)
J.3 Are you a CCP member, or reserved member of the CCP? (1 = yes)
J.4 Have you ever participated in political groups other than CCP and Communist Party Youth Or-
ganization? (1 = yes)
Panel K: Avoiding risky investment
K.1–2 Have you had the following investment experiences before? (Choose all that apply)
K.1 Stocks. (1 = no)
K.2 Bonds. (1 = no)
Panel L: Cooperation with minority
L.1 Have you worked with minority group students at school before (in study groups or class
projects)? (1 = yes)
A natural concern given the large number of survey question outcomes we examine is the
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possibility of false positives. To address concerns about multiple hypothesis testing, we construct
a z-score index variable for each of the sub-categories of attitudes we examine: trust in govern-
ment officials, bribery and civic-mindedness, perception of Chinese democracy, etc. Following
Anderson (2008), we standardize each component of the index and sum individuals’ standard-
ized outcomes (z-scores), weighting each outcome by the inverse of the covariance matrix of the
standardized outcomes.22 The index for each category will both help us address concerns about
multiple hypothesis testing (by reducing the number of hypotheses we test), and also capture
broad attitude changes that are only imperfectly measured by any single survey question. In
addition to examining the effects of the new curriculum on broad indices, when we examine indi-
vidual survey question outcomes, below, we address concerns about multiple hypothesis testing
by presenting p-values which are adjusted using the false discovery rate (FDR) procedure (Ben-
jamini, Krieger, and Yekutieli, 2006; Anderson, 2008). For transparency, we also show estimated
effects of the new curriculum on all of our survey questions (not just the outcomes of interest)
in Appendix F, Figure F.2.
3.2 Survey response rate
The response rate we achieved, 18.6%, is very much in line with other online surveys that rely
on impersonal, email recruitment.23 Because the response rate is lower than that seen in surveys
using alternative methods, it is important to discuss a range of questions about the inferences one
can make from our sample. The first question that arises is one of power: even if selection into
our survey were random, a low response rate can limit our ability to precisely estimate treatment
effects. However, the response rate was in line with our expectations from the literature on online
surveys, so our sample size is by design large enough to identify economically meaningful effects
of the new curriculum as statistically significant.
A second question is of greater concern for making causal claims: if selection into the sample
were non-random, this may bias our estimated treatment effects. It is important to emphasize
that for non-random selection into our sample to threaten the internal validity of our estimated
effects, the selection would need to be differential across curricula. We can test for differential
selection into the survey by curriculum in two ways. First, using information on the total number
of students enrolled in Peking University by province and cohort, we can estimate the difference
22We also standardize the z-score index to allow for easier interpretation of the magnitudes of our regression esti-
mates. Other methods used to construct a single variable that summarizes a set of related outcomes, for example, an
equally-weighted average of the standardized outcomes, or the first principal component of the set of outcome vari-
ables, generate very similar results (we present a broad set of results using first principal components in Appendix G).
Such index variables have been used to evaluate the effectiveness of policy interventions on a set of related outcomes;
see, for example, Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007).
23For example, in meta-analyses, Shih and Fan (2008) and Manfreda et al. (2008) find that around one-third of online
surveys examined have a response rate below 20% and over half have a response rate below 30%; see also Kaplowitz,
Hadlock, and Levine (2004).
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in response rates by curriculum, conditional on province and cohort fixed effects.24 In fact, we
find that the (conditional) response rate differs across curricula by less than 2 percentage points,
statistically indistinguishable from zero (see the note to Table G.3 in Appendix G). Second, we
can test for balance of observable student characteristics across curricula in our sample (again
conditional on province and cohort fixed effects). As we discuss below, we find that our sample
is balanced between curricula across a range of observable covariates. The lack of evidence of
selection correlated with the curriculum studied indicates that we are able to estimate an internally
valid causal effect of the new curriculum, conditional on being in our sample. We further discuss
concerns about selection into the survey, selection into Peking University, and the external validity
of the effects that we estimate in Section 5.
3.3 Interpreting the survey responses
Many of our outcome variables are self-reported responses to direct survey questions. It is natural
to wonder what exactly is captured by variation in these responses. Here we discuss several
concerns with using students’ responses to direct survey questions to evaluate the impact of the
new curriculum.
Do students try to respond “correctly” to exam-style questions? An important concern is that
students who study under different curricula may all have the same private attitudes, but if they
try to provide “correct” answers to questions that are similar in structure or content to exam ques-
tions, and if the correct answer differed across curricula, then responses to exam-style questions
might differ even if attitudes do not.
To address this possibility, we took care to ask our questions of interest in a manner that did
not look like the questions students would have seen in the gaokao or any other exam. Indeed,
other than a small number of factual questions related to the new curriculum, which we do not
include as part of our analysis of political attitudes, the vast majority of questions explicitly asked
about students’ own opinions. Most of our questions looked nothing like exam questions, and
they typically came from pre-existing social surveys that had nothing to do with the analysis of
Chinese education. For example, we asked students about their trust in various categories of gov-
ernment officials, which plausibly may have been influenced by students’ study of a curriculum
emphasizing the rule of law and citizen oversight of officials. Importantly, no exam ever asked
students direct questions about their trust of government officials.
One can see suggestive evidence in the distribution of students’ responses that our attempts
to write questions that elicited students’ opinions were successful. This can be best examined in
the case of the variables relating to trust in government officials, as they are measured on a 1–5
scale, allowing one to see shifts across the distribution of attitudes (we present the distributions
24In Appendix G, we show the number of respondents by province×cohort cell, as well as the number of students
enrolled in Peking University from each cell.
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of responses to these questions by curriculum in Appendix G, Table G.4). A first indication that
respondents are likely not attempting to provide “correct” responses is the broad range of answers
to all of the questions we asked. In each curriculum, for all outcomes, we found responses in the
full range, from 1 to 5, and in every case the modal response was provided by less than 60% of
students. Another indication that in the new curriculum there was not a clearly “correct” answer
to our questions about trust is that modal responses were not located at an end of the distribution.
Nor was there always the same modal response: we see either modes of 3 or 4 for our various
outcomes.
The changes in the distribution of responses across curricula are also consistent with students’
opinions changing, rather than simply moving to a new “correct” response. One can see that for
many outcomes, not only are there are shifts in the distribution toward the new curriculum modal
response (from below), but there are also movements away from the modal response (moving up).
For example, we asked students about their trust in local government on a 1–5 scale. Under the old
curriculum, the modal response was 3, with nearly 48% of students indicating this level of trust.
Under the new curriculum, the mode remained 3 (indicating no change in a “correct” answer),
with 45.25% of students choosing this response. Interestingly, responses of 1, 2, and the modal
response of 3 are all less common under the new curriculum, while the number of responses of
“4” increased by nearly 12 percentage points (over 50%).
Do students try to express socially-acceptable or politically correct views? A second concern
is that students who study under the new curriculum may not have their attitudes changed, but
respond to survey questions differently after learning about a different set of constraints on the
views that they ought to express. While there is always a concern that students will be afraid
to reveal stigmatized or politically incorrect beliefs, there are several reasons to take students’
responses in our survey at face value.25
First, none of our questions touched on topics that are taboo in China, such as multi-party
elections, views of the Communist Party per se, or direct criticism of the leadership of China. All
of the questions asked, indeed, were based on topics that were discussed in Chinese high school
curricula, and all of our questions were vetted by our mainland Chinese co-author (Chen); by
a variety of China scholars; and, by high school teachers with whom we spoke. Importantly,
recent scholarship on China provides evidence that criticism of the government online is both
prevalent (despite a lack of complete anonymity) and tolerated by the government; censors focus
their attention on silencing speech that may generate collective action (King, Pan, and Roberts,
2013), which the privately expressed attitudes in our survey surely would not do.
Second, the main survey was conducted privately, online, so there would have been no direct
social stigma attached to particular responses, nor should there have been strong experimenter de-
25The state’s ability to shape what individuals see as acceptable expression by changing the curriculum may itself be
of interest, and may have important consequences for political debate, coordination, and thus political behavior.
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mand effects. We also emphasized the confidentiality of students’ responses in the online consent
forms read prior to the survey (approved by the UC Berkeley Institutional Review Board).26
Third, as noted above, it is clear from the range of responses received in the survey that re-
sponses were not concentrated around a single “acceptable” response. Our questions regarding
trust in various government officials and government bodies are perhaps the most politically sen-
sitive of our survey questions. We find that 20% of individuals rate the central government at a 3
or below; for the provincial and local governments, this number is 38% and 65%, respectively; for
courts, the army, and police, we see responses of 3 or below from 37%, 31%, and 47% of students.
More students reported trust in the police at a level of “2” than at a level of “5”. Clearly, some
students were willing to give less than stellar marks to a range of government institutions.
Indeed, the fact that our study was run in Peking University makes it less likely that students
would self-censor their beliefs out of fear of government (or peer) reprisals for expressing critical
attitudes. Peking University is known to be a setting in which liberal views can expressed, even
contrary to government aims. Indeed, the University posted an article from the Atlantic magazine
on its website stating that it is “an open secret that teachers at the school and neighboring Tsinghua
University often broach topics critical of the government in the classroom”; a student quoted in
the article states that most students are “very liberal minded, so it’s ok to talk about sensitive
political things.” 27
We also examine whether students who are more risk averse (and so likely to be more con-
cerned about responding in a socially or politically acceptable way) exhibit different effects of the
new curriculum from students who are less risk averse. We find that the more risk averse respon-
dents in the study do not show significantly different effects of the new curriculum (see Appendix
G, Table G.5).
Stated preferences versus revealed preferences As a final check that students’ survey responses
were meaningful, we can compare students’ responses to direct questions about risk preferences to
their choices in an incentivized game eliciting risk preferences, which took place after the survey.
In the game, we elicit students’ certainty equivalent to a risky gamble (the greater the certainty
equivalent, the more risk-seeking is a student; see Dohmen et al., 2011). We find a positive, highly
statistically significant relationship between self-reported risk preferences and the certainty equiv-
alents from the incentivized game (in a bivariate regression, the coefficient on stated risk aversion
is 0.163, with a p<0.001). While questions about risk preferences are not likely to be associated
with stigmatized attitudes, this remains a useful check that students responded to the survey in a
manner that reflects their preferences.
26The paper and pencil follow-up was also completed privately.
27The article can be found at http://english.pku.edu.cn/News_Events/News/Outlook/10590.htm, last accessed
on January 26, 2014.
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4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Comparisons of means
To begin our analysis of the effect of the new curriculum, we simply compare means of students’
political attitudes across curricula; specifically, we examine means of the z-score indices con-
structed from the six broad categories of outcomes (12 sub-categories) described above. Within
the set of provinces for which we observe both students who studied the old curriculum and
students who studied the new curriculum, we group together provinces that have the same cur-
riculum introduction date (and thus, have the same number of cohorts in our sample under each
curriculum).28 To allow for a difference in differences-style comparison, we also plot mean atti-
tudes among students in provinces that do not have variation in curriculum among the cohorts
we study; we calculate means across cohorts that match the relevant comparisons for provinces
with variation in curriculum.
In Figure 3, we present these means graphically. The bars show means for the relevant group
of students in the provinces with variation in curriculum in our sample: comparing the bars, one
can see differences in political attitudes between students who studied different curricula. The
dots show means for the corresponding cohorts within the set of provinces without variation in
curriculum among the cohorts we study: comparing the dots, one can see the difference in political
attitudes across the same cohorts in the absence of any change in curriculum.
The top left graph (Panel A) shows means of trust in government officials by the curricu-
lum studied, for each set of provinces. One can see that for each set of provinces examined with
variation in curriculum, the mean level of trust is greater among individuals who studied un-
der the new curriculum. Examining the mean trust in government officials among students from
provinces without variation in curriculum in our sample, one can see almost no difference in trust
across cohorts. Panel B shows means of the index variable measuring perceptions of bribery and
views of government officials’ civic mindedness. For each set of provinces with variation in cur-
riculum, we find that studying the new curriculum is associated with the view that bribery is less
prevalent and effective, and with more positive views of officials. There is very little difference in
views on bribery and government officials across cohorts among students from provinces without
variation in curriculum in our sample.
In Panels C–I, one can see that for some attitudes (e.g., perceptions of Chinese democracy, skep-
28The oldest students in our survey sample were college seniors in the spring of 2013; they graduated from high
school in 2009 and entered high school in 2006. Thus, if a province introduced the new curriculum for the 2006 high
school entry cohort, the oldest students in our sample from that province (and all younger students, naturally) would
have studied under the new curriculum, and we would lack within-province, cross-cohort variation in curriculum.
The youngest students in our sample were college freshmen in the spring of 2013; they graduated from high school
in 2012, and entered high school in 2009. Thus, if a province introduced the new curriculum in 2010, we would not
observe anyone from that province who studied the new curriculum. The 13 provinces with variation in curriculum
in our sample are Beijing, Hunan, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Shaanxi, Henan, Xinjiang, Jiangxi, Shanxi, Hubei, Yunnan, Inner
Mongolia, and Hebei.
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ticism of markets, and views on Chinese ethnic identity), there are consistent differences across
curricula for all sets of provinces (in the direction the Chinese government desired). Other atti-
tudes (e.g., national identity or views of the environment) are not consistently associated with the
curriculum studied. Examining differences in attitudes among students from provinces without
variation in curriculum in our sample, one can see that there are rarely differences in attitudes
across cohorts that match the differences associated with the curriculum studied.
Panel J shows that engagement in political behavior, such as voting, is often lower among
students exposed to the new curriculum. Some of this is simply due to differences in opportunities
to engage in political behavior across cohorts. For example, Beijing last had a People’s Congress
election in 2011; thus, freshmen in our sample, who entered university in 2012, had no opportunity
to vote in Beijing—and likely no opportunity to vote at all given their age.29 Older students also
have had more chances to join political organizations such as the Chinese Communist Party—
seniors are twice as likely to be in the CCP as freshmen. This is apparent, too, in the political
behavior of students from provinces without variation in curriculum in our sample.
In the last row, one can see that students exposed to the new curriculum systematically engage
in less risky investment behavior (Panel K), consistent with the greater skepticism of markets seen
in Panel F. There is almost no difference in the investment behavior of students from the same
cohorts, but coming from provinces without variation in curriculum in our sample. Finally, we do
not see consistent differences across curricula in cooperating with minorities (Panel L).
Overall, for our broad categories of governance, political institutions, and economic institutions,
the raw data suggest that the government may have been able to shift attitudes in the desired
direction, while evidence on identity and on environment is more mixed, as is the effect of the new
curriculum on behavior associated with the government’s desired attitude changes.
4.2 Empirical model
We next examine these differences in a regression framework, including all provinces, and con-
trolling for province and cohort fixed effects. We estimate a generalized difference in differences
model, as follows:
yicp = ∑
c
γc + ∑
p
δp + β NewCurriculumcp + ε icp, (1)
where yicp is either an individual survey question or an index variable (i denotes the individual,
c the high school entry cohort, and p the province of high school attendance); γc and δp are full
sets of cohort and province fixed effects; and β is the coefficient of interest, capturing the effect of
the new curriculum, conditional on fixed differences across cohorts and fixed differences across
provinces. In our main estimates, we allow idiosyncratic differences, ε icp, to be correlated across
29Note that among provinces that introduced the new curriculum in 2009, all of the students who studied the new
curriculum in our sample were freshmen.
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individuals within a province×cohort cell (the level at which the curriculum varies).30 In addition
to this baseline specification, we will estimate additional specifications below: (i) we disaggre-
gate the effects of the new curriculum by cohort; (ii) we include individual-level controls; (iii) we
include province×cohort-level controls; (iv) and, we include a full set of province-specific, cross-
cohort trends (in addition to the province and cohort fixed effects).
Our baseline model allows us to address a variety of concerns about our ability to identify the
causal effect of the new curriculum. First, one may be concerned that province-level differences
in openness, income levels, and policies may be correlated with attitudes. However, fixed dif-
ferences across provinces cannot drive our estimated effects of the new curriculum, because we
control for province fixed effects and exploit cross-cohort variation within provinces (non-random
introduction of the curriculum across provinces is discussed further in Section 5). Similarly, one
might worry about the evolution of attitudes across cohorts even in the absence of a change in the
curriculum; by including cohort fixed effects, we are able to difference out cross-cohort changes
that occur even in the absence of a change in the curriculum.
One might still be concerned about time-varying factors that affect different provinces in dif-
ferent years. For example, one may worry about differences in economic growth rates across
provinces or about shocks, such as the Sichuan earthquake of 2008, which might differentially af-
fect different provinces. It is important to emphasize, however, that province×time varying shocks
are not necessarily province×cohort varying shocks: a confounding factor would need to differ-
entially affect different high school entry cohorts within a province to threaten our identification
strategy. The cross-cohort variation we exploit is within a very narrow window, and very sharp:
individuals entering high school just one year apart studied entirely different curricula around the
introduction of the new curriculum. This method of introducing the new curriculum considerably
reduces concerns about omitted variables, as many time-varying, province-specific shocks seem
unlikely to have very different effects across adjacent cohorts of students, and so will be absorbed
by the province fixed effects.
Finally, even unobserved factors that do vary at the province×cohort level will often affect
adjacent cohorts within the same province smoothly, rather than sharply. Our specification that
includes controls for province-specific, cross-cohort trends is able to capture smooth, province-
specific changes in attitudes across cohorts. This specification is especially demanding as it at-
tributes to the new curriculum only the “jump” in attitudes relative to the cross-cohort trend.
Thus, although the introduction of the new curriculum was not random across time and space,
many differences across provinces and across cohorts—other than the curriculum change—are
likely to be absorbed by our control variables, leaving us more confident that we are able to iden-
tify the causal effect of the new curriculum.
30We also present p-values based on clustering at the province level; due to the small number of clusters in this case,
we implemented the wild bootstrap procedure (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller, 2008).
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4.3 Balance of student characteristics
We present summary statistics for the survey sample in Table 2, columns 1–2, and show the mean
characteristics of students by curriculum (old, then new) in columns 3–4. We next check for bal-
ance of observable characteristics among survey respondents across new and old curricula. A lack
of balance could arise from differential selection into the survey sample or from shifts in matricula-
tion into Peking University as a result of the curriculum change (or some other province×cohort-
specific shock).
In Table 2, columns 5 and 6, we present the raw differences, and the p-values testing for the
statistical significance of these differences in characteristics of students who studied under the old
and new curricula in our sample. One can see in the table that there are significant differences
across the two groups. However, it is worth emphasizing: this unconditional imbalance is to be
expected. Students who studied under the new curriculum are younger on average (the new
curriculum was introduced later in time), and come from provinces where the curriculum was
introduced earlier—and there was no random assignment of introduction years across provinces,
so differences across students from different provinces appear as well (for example, the fraction of
Han Chinese).
In Table 2, columns 7 and 8, we show differences between students in the new and old cur-
ricula, conditional on province and cohort fixed effects, and the p-values testing for the statistical
significance of these conditional differences. (We estimate equation 1 with student characteristics
as outcomes, and present the coefficient on the NewCurriculum dummy variable.) One can see
that accounting for average characteristics in the province of origin, and accounting for average
characteristics of a cohort, those individuals in our sample who studied under the new curriculum
look statistically indistinguishable on observable characteristics from those who studied under the
old curriculum.
4.4 Regression estimates of the effect of the new curriculum
We begin our regression analysis by estimating our difference in differences model in equation 1,
but rather than pool the students who studied under the old curriculum and new curriculum into
two coarse categories (old curriculum and new), we allow students to have different attitudes
depending on the “distance” between their cohort and the first cohort that studied under the new
curriculum in their province. This allows us to examine whether outcomes differed across cohorts
even prior to the curriculum reform (which would call into question our identification strategy),
and also to verify that there is a sharp change in outcomes precisely with the first cohort exposed
to the new curriculum. We treat the last cohort studying under the old curriculum in a particular
province as the omitted category, and compare it to the cohorts entering high school two or more
years before the curriculum change, the first cohort that studied the new curriculum, and the
cohorts that entered high school two or more years after the new curriculum was introduced.
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In Figure 4, we present coefficients and 95% confidence intervals on the dummy variables in-
dicating a student’s cohort relative to the introduction of the new curriculum in his/her province,
for each of the index variables in our six broad outcome categories. In the governance, political in-
stitutions, and economic institutions graphs, one can see clear, significant jumps in outcomes—shifts
in attitudes in the Chinese government’s desired direction—moving from the last cohort under
the old curriculum to the first cohort that studied the new curriculum. We do not find significant
differences in identity, and attitudes toward the environment move in the direction opposite to the
one hypothesized. Our findings for behavior are mixed, with the “avoiding risky investment” out-
come sharply differing across curricula (the increase in the outcome reflects less risky investment
among students exposed to the new curriculum), while political behavior and cooperation with
minorities do not differ much across cohorts.
Figure 4 also allows to examine whether attitudes were trending in the direction desired by
the Chinese government even prior to the introduction of the new curriculum. One can see that
there is almost no evidence of meaningful pre-trends in Figure 4; indeed, it is almost never the
case that students who entered high school two or more years prior to the curriculum change
have attitudes or behavioral outcomes that significantly differ from students in the final cohort
that studied the old curriculum. One can also see that outcomes are quite similar for all cohorts
that studied under the new curriculum: the sharp differences in attitudes we find across curricula
are not limited either to the first year of introduction, or to the students in our sample who are
youngest, and thus closest to their exposure to the high school curriculum.
We next estimate the standard difference in differences model (equation 1), examining differ-
ences between students exposed to the new and old curricula, controlling for province and cohort
fixed effects. Figure 5 shows the coefficient estimate on the NewCurriculum dummy variable
from estimating equation 1, as well as the 95% confidence interval, for each of the individual sur-
vey questions presented in Section 3, as well as the index variables analyzed in Figures 3 and 4.
For ease of presentation, we standardize each outcome variable and we plot the absolute value of
the coefficient; coefficients with positive signs are denoted with closed symbols, while coefficients
with negative signs are denoted with open symbols (we also indicate the sign of the estimate in
brackets). As noted above, responses are coded such that a positive effect indicates a movement
towards the Chinese government’s desired attitudes. The figure also includes p-values (adjusted
using the false discovery rate procedure) from a test that the coefficient on NewCurriculum equals
zero.
Scanning the dot plot, one can see quite a bit of consistency within the categories and sub-
categories that we examine: across a wide range of questions about trust in government officials,
we find significant increases in trust associated with study of the new curriculum. One can also
see that students view government officials as more civic-minded (less self-interested and less
likely to serve the rich and powerful) and see bribery as less necessary across a range of domains.
Note that in some cases, individual results are not statistically significant when we adjust p-values
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to reflect our testing of multiple hypotheses, but the consistency of the signs of the effects, and the
significant index variables are suggestive of meaningful attitude changes.
Continuing to move down the dot plot, one can see that students view China as more demo-
cratic if they studied the new curriculum; they view people’s participation as a defining char-
acteristic of democracy (albeit not statistically significantly so); and, they often express greater
skepticism of the wisdom of the masses, or “unconstrained democracy”. The finding that stu-
dents exposed to the new curriculum both see China as more democratic, and are more cautious
about unconstrained democracy matches what we see in the new curriculum textbooks’ content.
Attitudes toward the market were only elicited in one survey question, which shows a sig-
nificant shift toward greater skepticism of unconstrained markets—consistent with the new cur-
riculum textbooks’ content. Attitudes toward ethnic minorities show mixed differences across
curricula. Students’ express an identity that is more “Chinese” than “world citizen” if they study
the new curriculum, but the result is not statistically significant. Next, one can see that attitudes
toward the environment consistently move in the opposite direction from that intended by the
government, though not statistically significantly so. Finally, there are positive, but insignificant,
effects of the new curriculum on political behavior and cooperation with minorities, and a posi-
tive, significant effect on avoiding risky investments.
In Table 3, we present the analysis shown in Figure 5 (but note that outcomes are not standard-
ized), as well as some additional information. We show coefficient point estimates; standard errors
clustered at the province×cohort level; standard p-values and FDR-adjusted p-values; means and
variances of the dependent variables; and, estimated persuasion rates (we discuss persuasion rates
in Section 5, below). As can also be seen in Figure 5, along the three dimensions that the curricu-
lum significantly affected (views on governance, political institutions, and economic institutions),
studying under the new curriculum is associated with a change in attitudes of around 10–20% of
a standard deviation.
We also include in Table 3 an important falsification exercise. A natural question that arises in
interpreting our finding of a significant effect of the new curriculum on trust in government offi-
cials is whether the new curriculum was associated with greater trust more broadly, rather than
specifically greater trust in government officials. We thus examine students’ responses to ques-
tions about their trust in a variety of non-governmental entities (NGOs, banks, foreign investors)
and about their trust in people in general. In the bottom row of Panel A in Table 3, one can see
that an aggregate index of trust in these non-governmental entities and individuals is not affected
by the introduction of the new curriculum (the point estimate is very close to zero and not signif-
icant), reinforcing our interpretation that the content in the new curriculum specifically increased
trust in Chinese government officials.
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5 Discussion
5.1 Robustness checks
We next explore the robustness of our results for the six outcome categories examined; we show
robustness specifications only for the z-score indices constructed to summarize each category’s
outcomes. As above, if a category includes only a single question, we examine that, rather than
an index variable.
In Table 4, Panel A, we present our baseline estimates of the effects of the new curriculum using
a parsimonious specification that includes only province and cohort fixed effects. In addition to
our coefficient estimates and standard errors clustered at the province×cohort level, we add (in
parentheses in the fourth row) p-values based on clustering at the province level; due to the small
number of clusters in this case, we implemented the wild bootstrap procedure (Cameron, Gelbach,
and Miller, 2008). For comparison, p-values from standard errors clustered at the province×cohort
level are presented in the row above. One can see that changing the level of clustering does not
affect our statistical inferences.
Because we have a relatively small number of treated observations in our sample, we also
make our statistical inferences in an alternative manner, by comparing the treatment effect we es-
timate for each index variable to the distribution of placebo treatment effects we estimate when
randomly assigning new curriculum introduction dates to provinces. To be precise, we randomly
assign new curriculum introduction dates to provinces, with the dates drawn from the actual set of
introduction dates of the new curriculum, without replacement (so in a given year, the same num-
ber of provinces have the placebo new curriculum introduced as had the actual new curriculum
introduced, but the placebo assignment will be to a random selection of provinces). We randomly
draw 10,000 sets of placebo treatment assignments, and estimate equation 1, for each of the six
main index variable categories. In Appendix G, Figure G.3, we plot the distribution of t-statistics
from the 10,000 estimated placebo treatment effects for each outcome and mark the location of
the t-statistic of the actual treatment effect within the distribution. We also report the share of
the placebo t-statistics that is larger than the actual statistic, in absolute value. One can view this
measure as analogous to a p-value; across outcomes, the inferences drawn are very similar to the
standard regressions.
We next examine the robustness of the estimated effects of the new curriculum to the inclusion
of additional control variables. We begin by adding to our baseline specification student-level
controls for the individual and household characteristics reported in Panels A–D of Table 2.31 In
Table 4, Panel B, one can see that including these individual-level controls does not affect our
31The one exception is the indicator that a student studied the humanities track in high school, because it is missing
for more than 300 students who did not take the gaokao exam as part of their admission to Peking University. Note that
we do include a dummy for whether a student took the gaokao exam.
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findings.32
An alternative approach to studying differences in student characteristics across curricula is
to use our students’ background characteristics (the same used as controls in Table 4, Panel B) to
predict the z-score index variables for our six categories of outcomes, and test whether predicted
outcomes differ across curricula. In Appendix G, Table G.8, we present the estimated coefficient
on the NewCurriculum dummy from estimating equation 1 with predicted index variables as the
outcomes. In every case, the estimated effect of the new curriculum on the predicted outcomes
based on observables is close to 0 and statistically insignificant.
Another important question about our analysis is whether the introduction of the new curricu-
lum coincided with other provincial variation which might affect attitudes at the province×cohort
level. One possibility is that school spending may have been greater for those cohorts in a province
exposed to the new curriculum; if so, then some of our effects may be driven by school spending,
rather than changes in the curriculum’s content. We thus control for provincial spending on sec-
ondary education at the province×cohort level (calculated as a province’s average level of spend-
ing during the three years of senior high school for each cohort).33 One can see in Table 4, Panel C
that the estimated effects of the new curriculum controlling for spending on secondary education
at the province×cohort level are nearly identical to the baseline estimates.
Another possibility is that students who experienced important political transitions while in
high school may have differing views on governance, political institutions, etc. To examine this
possibility, we collected information on all of the transitions of provincial governors and provin-
cial party secretaries (from baike.baidu.com and www.wikipedia.org) that occurred while stu-
dents in our sample were in high school. We then estimate our baseline specification, but con-
trolling for either the experience of a provincial governor turnover or a provincial party secretary
turnover while a student was in high school. In Appendix G, Table G.9, one can see that these
controls do not affect our results.
More generally, one might be interested in the determinants of a province adopting the new
curriculum in a particular year and be concerned that these factors may affect student attitudes.
We explore this question in detail in Appendix G, Table G.10, using two approaches: first, we treat
China’s provinces as a cross-section, and allow province characteristics in 2003 (just prior to the
first wave of introduction) to determine the timing of adoption; second, we consider a panel (ob-
servations at the province×year level), with province characteristics in a given year determining
new curriculum adoption in the following year. For each dataset we estimate OLS models and
Cox proportional hazard models. Our most robust finding is that greater 2003 province income
is quite predictive of earlier introduction of the new curriculum (as are other variables correlated
32We also examine whether differences in students’ personalities may affect our results, estimating our baseline
model for our six broad outcome categories, controlling for an individual’s “Big 5” personality traits z-scores, and our
results are unchanged (see Appendix G, Table G.7).
33Data are taken from the China Educational Finance Statistical Yearbook, published by the Finance Department, Min-
istry of Education of the People’s Republic of China (2004–2012).
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with income, such as fiscal revenues and employment). Educational variables are generally less
predictive, except for the percentage of primary school students enrolling in secondary school,
which again is correlated with income.
To determine whether higher 2003 incomes were associated with systematic differences in at-
titudes across cohorts, in Table 4, Panel D, we present estimated effects of the new curriculum, but
controlling for the interaction between a province’s 2003 gross regional product per capita inter-
acted with the four cohort fixed effects. One can see that including these controls does not affect
our findings.
Another concern is that differing trends in attitudes across cohorts in different provinces may
play some role in generating the differences in attitudes we attribute to the new curriculum. To
address this concern, we estimate equation 1, but include a full set of province fixed effects inter-
acted with cohort-level trends. That is, we allow each province to have its own (linear) trend in
attitudes across cohorts, and we identify the effect of the new curriculum as a deviation from the
trend. In Table 4, Panel E, one can see that controlling for province-specific cross-cohort trends
does not qualitatively affect any of our estimates of the effects of the new curriculum.
A final concern about our baseline specification is regarding our sample’s composition. Some
provinces do not have any variation in curriculum studied among the four cohorts in our sample,
but these provinces are included in our baseline estimates (though they were excluded from our
comparison of means in Figure 3). One might wish to estimate the effects of the new curriculum
on a balanced panel that includes only provinces in which we observe variation in curriculum. We
thus estimate the effect of the new curriculum using a “short panel” that includes only students
from the last cohort under the old curriculum and the (adjacent) first cohort of the new curriculum,
from the 13 provinces for which we observe students from both of these cohorts in our sample.
Using this alternative dataset, our results are very similar to those estimated using the entire set
of province×cohort cells (see Appendix G, Table G.11).
5.2 Addressing additional questions about our findings
Concerns about the online survey response rate An important question about our estimates is
whether they may have been driven by unusual selection into our online survey. Above we noted
that response rates between students under the two curricula are statistically indistinguishable,
and that student characteristics in our sample are balanced across curricula, suggesting that stu-
dents’ self-selection into our survey likely does not explain our results. Still one might wonder
whether the sample on which we estimate the effect of the new curriculum is very atypical, even
relative to the rest of Peking University.
As an additional check that the treatment effects we estimate from the online survey do not
greatly differ from what we would find among non-respondents at Peking University, we con-
ducted a paper and pencil follow-up survey using in-person recruitment, in June and July, 2014
(see Appendix E.5 for a more detailed description of the follow-up survey). The follow-up survey
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was conducted by a team of Peking University undergraduates, who recruited survey participants
in the Peking University dorms, and handed out a paper version of the same survey questionnaire
as was used online (to be completed individually, and privately). The recruiters invited 446 stu-
dents who had not completed the online survey to complete the paper survey; the response rate
in the follow-up survey was 78%, for a total of 347 respondents.
We estimate our baseline specification on the follow-up survey sample, examining the index
variable outcomes in our 12 sub-categories, and find that in 8 of 12 cases the signs of the estimated
effects of the new curriculum match our baseline estimates (compare Table 5, Panels A and B).
Results for governance, economic institutions, and the environment are both qualitatively and
quantitatively very similar between the main survey and the follow-up. Thus, although there are
two categories (views of the “wisdom of the masses” and political behavior) for which we find
quite different effects of the new curriculum in the follow-up survey, we are reassured that the
follow-up survey results generally match those in the main survey.
Concerns about differential selection into Peking University following curriculum change An-
other concern is that students with pre-existing differences in political attitudes were differentially
selected into Peking University across the two curricula: students who had political attitudes more
concordant with the new curriculum’s ideological aims may have scored better on the gaokao col-
lege entrance exam, and thus been admitted to the University in greater numbers following the
curriculum change. One check of whether this was likely an important driver of our results is
to examine the effects of the new curriculum on students who were enrolled in the science track
in high school. These students were examined on the Politics material, but the test was much
lower-stakes than that taken by students in the humanities track, and would not have played a
first-order role in determining their university admissions.
We thus split the sample by students’ high school subject track.34 Among the sub-sample
of students who studied the science track in high school, the effects of the new curriculum are
qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to our main results (see Table 5, Panel C). The one
notable difference between the main results and those estimated on the science track students is
that the effect of the new curriculum on skepticism toward free markets is no longer statistically
significant (though the coefficient is positive). When we examine the sub-sample of humanities
track students, we again find results that are qualitatively very similar to our baseline findings
(see Table 5, Panel D).
Checking implementation of the curriculum reform and students’ textbook recall To what ex-
tent was the curriculum reform implemented as designed, with the new textbooks introduced
according to our assignment of province×cohort cells? As a check that our province×cohort-level
34Around 15% of the students in our sample could not be assigned to a subject track because they did note take the
gaokao (our assignment of track was based on a question we asked about the subjects a student was examined on in the
gaokao).
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assignment of students to curricula is accurate—and as a check that students have some recollec-
tion of their high school textbook—we examine students’ responses to a survey question (asked
at the end of our survey) in which we presented them with images of the covers of Politics text-
books from the old and new curricula and asked them to identify the textbook they used (allowing
them to indicate that they did not remember which textbook was theirs). Remarkably, we find that
nearly every student in our survey—around 94%—identified as their high school textbook the one
that we would predict based on the introduction dates by province presented in Figure 1. We also
estimate our baseline econometric model of equation 1, predicting students’ choice of the new
curriculum Politics textbook (as opposed to selecting the old textbook, reporting that they did not
remember their textbook, or reporting a textbook not shown). The results in Table 6, column 1,
confirm that the curriculum reform was rolled out according to what we expected, and indicate
that the vast majority of students recall their high school textbook.
Effects of the curriculum on students’ factual knowledge It is also of interest to examine whether
purely descriptive (rather than persuasive) textbook content that differed across curricula gener-
ated persistent differences in students’ knowledge. In addition to ideological content, the new
curriculum included new factual content regarding Chinese political institutions. We next exam-
ine whether factual details of China’s political system were differentially known by individuals
who studied under the new curriculum.
Our survey included questions asking students whether they were aware of elections for the
position of village head and for the position of People’s Congress Representative. Discussion of
these elections is much more extensive in the new curriculum textbook than in the old curricu-
lum textbook (as seen in Table 1, the word “election” appears 2 times in the old curriculum and
120 times in the new). We thus estimate our baseline regression model, with the two “election
awareness” variables as outcomes; one can see in Table 6, columns 2–3, that study of the new cur-
riculum is, indeed, strongly associated with greater knowledge of political institutions covered in
the new curriculum textbooks. An index variable outcome based on these two factual questions
also shows a significant effect of the new curriculum on students’ knowledge of Chinese political
institutions (Table 6, column 4).
An important question regarding the nature of the political persuasion we observe is to what
extent it was based on the provision of new information, as opposed to purely ideological, persua-
sive content. On the one hand it is clear that there was new, purely ideological content introduced
in the new curriculum—this can be seen in many of the quotes from the new curriculum’s text-
books above. On the other hand, our findings here suggest that factual additions to the new
curriculum may have affected students’ beliefs and attitudes as well.
The impact of changes in instructional methods A final question about the implementation of
the curriculum reform is whether, in addition to changing the content of textbooks, the curriculum
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reform changed teaching practice. Indeed, under the reform, class discussions were to be encour-
aged, and there was to be a reduced emphasis on the rote memorization of material by students.
One might be concerned that shifts in teaching practice may have directly affected students’ atti-
tudes, or affected students’ willingness to think independently or to express certain opinions, thus
affecting responses to our survey (see, e.g., Algan, Cahuc, and Shleifer, 2013, on the importance
of teaching practices in shaping students beliefs and attitudes). However, as noted above, there
is a widespread perception in China that teaching practices did not change as a result of the re-
form: teachers’ and students’ incentives were still strongly directed toward the memorization of
textbook content in order to succeed in the gaokao college entrance exam.
To determine whether students’ perceptions of their teachers’ methods differed across curric-
ula, we asked several survey questions relating to teaching practices that the reforms may have
changed: we asked whether teachers encouraged class participation; whether students explored
answers on their own (as opposed to being told correct answers up front); and, whether mem-
orizing material was important to doing well in school. From these individual questions, we
constructed an index of standardized outcomes that captures changes in students’ perceptions of
teaching practices (the components of the index were all coded such that a positive change in the
index indicated change in the direction desired by reformers). In addition to this index, we also
directly asked students, “how much do you think class/lecture or teaching activity is centered on
gaokao preparation?”
In Table 6, we present the estimated effects of the new curriculum on the teaching practices
index (column 5), and on students’ perceptions of the focus of teaching on gaokao preparation
(column 6). One can see that the new curriculum did not have a statistically significant effect
on the broad teaching methods index or on students’ perceptions of teachers’ focus on gaokao
preparation. Thus, we do not believe that changed teaching practices concurrent with the textbook
reform explain our findings.
5.3 Benchmarking the effect sizes
Persuasion rates In order to quantify the magnitude of the effect of the new curriculum, for each
individual question in our six broad categories of outcomes we compute persuasion rates (DellaV-
igna and Gentzkow, 2010): the estimated percentage of individuals who did not initially hold the
view that the new curriculum aimed to instill (the “desired belief”), but who did hold the belief if
they were exposed to the new curriculum (and analogously for behavior). One could calculate this
as the estimated treatment effect of the new curriculum divided by the share of students who do
not hold the desired belief (engage in the desired behavior) in the entire sample.35 A more correct
35For a binary outcome variable, this is straightforward; for questions that do not have a binary outcome we calculate
the persuasion rate based on a transformed dependent variable, which equals one if the outcome is greater than or equal
to the median answer. In Table 3, we always present the the main regression results, i.e., the estimate of the treatment
effect of the new curriculum, based on the original data (for example, on a scale from 1 to 10), while the persuasion
rates reported are calculated with the binary analogue. Note that in one case—“bribes are not necessary in interactions
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definition of the persuasion rate would require us to divide the effect of the new curriculum by the
share of students without the desired attitude among individuals who studied under the old cur-
riculum; however, the compositional differences (by province and cohort) in the sample between
old and new curriculum students would distort the results. As an alternative, we estimate the
fraction of individuals who would hold the desired belief in the absence of the new curriculum.
To do so, we predict students’ beliefs using our baseline regression model, but for students who
studied under the new curriculum, we subtract the treatment effect of the new curriculum. We
then average the predicted outcomes for those who studied under the new curriculum and the old
curriculum, and use this to calculate the fraction of the sample who would not hold the desired
view in the absence of the new curriculum. We then use this share to compute the “conditional”
persuasion rate.
In our presentation of regression results in Table 3, we included estimates of the implied con-
ditional persuasion rates. The persuasion rates we find are substantial: across all outcomes (in-
cluding those for which the effects did not go in the government’s desired direction), the median
persuasion rate was 8%; more than a quarter of the outcomes we examine show persuasion rates
of greater than 20%. This is a large effect relative to estimates of persuasion rates found for vari-
ous media in prior work; for example, DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) find a persuasion rate from
Fox News of approximately 3–8%, and DellaVigna et al. (2014) find a persuasion rate of 4–5% for
Serbian radio in Croatia.36 It is plausible that persuasion rates for educational content are consid-
erably larger than those for media—owing, for example, to the intensity of exposure, and perhaps
to the greater pliability of youths’ views.37
Effects on attitudes and behavior: evidence from the Asian Barometer Survey Our survey
results on behavior—particularly political behavior—reflect the ambiguity of the mapping from
political attitudes to political behavior.38 As noted above, we believe that this analysis is affected
by Peking University students’ constrained opportunities to engage in many political activities of
interest. We thus examine the association between political attitudes and reported political behav-
ior using data from the Asian Barometer Survey, which covers a broader population, including
older individuals who are less constrained in acting on their political attitudes.39
The Asian Barometer Survey asks respondents about their trust in various government offi-
cials, just as we asked the students in our sample. The survey also asks respondents about various
with police”—the median response equals the maximum possible response, so no persuasion rate is presented. Also
note that we do not present persuasion rates when outcomes did not move in the direction desired by the Chinese
government as students were not, on average, persuaded to hold the government’s desired attitudes.
36Enikolopov, Petrova, and Zhuravskaya (2011) find an 8% persuasion rate in an analysis of an independent Russian
TV station’s effect on voting for the opposition parties it supported. They find a much larger, 65%, persuasion rate for
the TV station’s message of opposition to the pro-government party.
37See Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004) for a discussion of the influence of media and education on ideology.
38See Holbrook (2011) for a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of inferring attitudes from behavior.
39The survey is hosted by the Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica, and the Institute for the Advanced
Studies of Humanities and Social Sciences, National Taiwan University. See http://www.asianbarometer.org.
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forms of disruptive political expression, including whether they have attended a demonstration
or protest march at least once during the past three years, and whether they have refused to pay
taxes or fees to the government during the same time period. Around 3% of respondents report
having attended a demonstration, and 1.5% report refusing to pay taxes. We examine the associ-
ation between reported levels of trust in local government officials (most relevant to the political
behaviors we study) and reported political actions, among mainland Chinese respondents with at
least 12 years of schooling.
Our regression estimates (presented in Appendix G, Table G.12) indicate that one standard
deviation greater trust in the Asian Barometer Survey is associated with a 2 percentage point
reduction in the likelihood of attending a protest or demonstration, and a 1 percentage point re-
duction in the likelihood of refusing to pay taxes or fees. In Figure 5, we saw that studying the new
curriculum is associated with around a one-quarter standard deviation increase in trust in local
government officials. Thus, under the assumption that the relationship between an individual’s
trust in government officials and their political action is similar for students in our survey to that
for the broader set of educated individuals in the Asian Barometer sample, the new curriculum
would make students around 15–20% less likely to engage in these disruptive political activities
relative to their means.
5.4 External validity
As with any study that relies on quasi-experimental variation, our estimated effects are “local”
to our particular context. We believe this context is of special interest: not only do we study a
naturally-occurring policy change, but we also study a group of students whose views are most
likely to shape Chinese political discourse—China’s educated elite. In addition, we study the
impact of a change in educational content during students’ critical years (Krosnick and Alwin,
1989; Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2013), with a lag of several years. This is of some interest—beliefs
shaped by the curriculum would need to be persistent in order to be observed in our survey,
and beliefs formed in students’ late teens and early twenties may be most likely to persist into
adulthood.
Of course, one should use caution when generalizing from our results to the effect of the cur-
riculum change on other Chinese students exposed to it. Peking University students uniformly
excelled in their high school studies, and so are more likely than other students to have learned
the material in the high school curriculum. This might lead our estimated effects to be larger
than for other samples of Chinese high school graduates (let alone for non-graduates). However,
it is worth emphasizing, as discussed above, that our survey questions did not look like exam
questions, but rather gauged students’ opinions. Moreover, there is good reason to think that
our estimates may actually be lower bounds of the curriculum change’s effects on other Chinese
students: students who choose to enter Peking University are seen as China’s most liberal, and
critical of government, so are likely be less easily persuaded by the content of their high school
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textbooks than are other students.40
It is also worth noting that our survey can shed some light on heterogeneous effects of the new
curriculum. In Appendix G, Table G.13, we examine the effects of the new curriculum allowing
there to be heterogeneity depending on students’, and their parents’, characteristics. While we
find that these characteristics (e.g., parents membership in the CCP or students’ consumption
of foreign media) are associated with differing political attitudes across students, they are not
significant sources of heterogeneity in the effects of the new curriculum.41
6 Conclusion
The Chinese government laid out a set of ambitious goals for curriculum reform in the early 2000s:
the government wanted to shape students’ views on the legitimacy of the Chinese government’s
institutions; political participation and democracy in China; and, the role of the state in the econ-
omy. In all of these aims, we find evidence that the new curriculum introduced by the government
successfully changed students’ views of fundamental aspects of the society in which they lived.
The magnitudes of the effects were both statistically significant and quite large: persuasion rates
for a variety of important political and economic attitudes are estimated to be larger than those
estimated in other settings, from other sources of information, such as television.
The government also indicated a desire to shape students’ identities, uniting the Han majority
and minorities within a traditional Chinese ethnic spirit. We do not find statistically compelling
evidence that the government was successful in this aim, though in general attitudes moved in the
direction the government desired. The new curriculum also did not succeed in making students
more environmentally conscious, perhaps because of a perceived policy tradeoff between priori-
ties of economic development and environmental protection, and perhaps because environmental
issues were not greatly emphasized in the new curriculum. Finally, the effects of the curriculum
on students’ behavior were mixed, which may reflect constraints on students’ political behavior.
Our findings provide evidence on three broad theories of the roles played by school curricula
in shaping political attitudes. First, and most broadly, they suggest that an authoritarian state
can effectively indoctrinate students. Chinese students who studied under the new curriculum
trusted a broad range of government officials more; viewed Chinese political institutions as more
democratic; and, were more skeptical of free markets. These are precisely the sorts of outcomes
that scholars suspicious of elite control of educational institutions would fear (for example, Freire,
1970; Bowles and Gintis, 1976; Lott, Jr., 1999).
40An Atlantic article posted on the Peking University website (quoted above) makes this point very explicitly
(http://english.pku.edu.cn/News Events/News/Outlook/10590.htm).
41One might also wonder whether, due to variation in response rates, our estimates differ from what one would find
from a sample that matched the composition of Peking University. In Appendix G, Table G.14, we examine the effects
of the new curriculum, but re-weighting each observation by the inverse of the survey response rate in the respondent’s
province×cohort cell. Using the re-weighted observations produces results very similar to our baseline estimates.
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But there is also a brighter side to our findings: scholars who have argued that education can
be crucial to the development of a functional democracy and the teaching of civic values (e.g.,
Dewey, 1916; Lipset, 1959; Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shleifer, 2007; Bandiera et al., 2015) also find
support in our results, which suggest that educational content can shape students’ views of po-
litical institutions. Finally, our results provide weaker evidence of education forming students’
national and ethnic identities (see Weber, 1976; Gradstein and Justman, 2002; Gradstein and Just-
man, 2005; Clots-Figueras and Masella, 2013; Alesina and Reich, 2013): the new curriculum only
marginally (and not significantly) affected students’ expressed identities.
While we find causal effects of school curricula on students’ ideology, the social welfare conse-
quences of these effects depend on the political economy of curriculum choice: to the extent that
educational content is selected to shape ideology, rather than to produce human capital, there can
be a significant cost of using the education system to indoctrinate—certainly to students being
educated, and perhaps to elites as well, if they benefit from more productive workers. On the
other hand, the beliefs shaped by the schooling system might be extremely beneficial, as they may
reduce social friction, improve coordination in a variety of settings, and establish socially-valuable
norms. Of course, the norms instilled in school may be disproportionately beneficial to the seated
elite, who have the ability to shape what is taught.
These results thus suggest an analysis of the political economy nexus when thinking about
the government’s incentives to provide education. Cantoni and Yuchtman (2013) examine elites’
choices of whether to introduce particular educational content in important historical settings,
but political choices are made regarding educational content around the world shaping political
outcomes as well as human capital accumulation. We believe that the choices that elites make
regarding educational content deserve further study.
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Figure 1: Years of introduction of the new curriculum textbooks.
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Figure 2: Cumulative distribution functions of the percentage change in a word’s frequency across
curricula for three sets of words: the 1,166 words in the State Council document, “Suggestions on
Strengthening the Ideological and Moral Construction of Our Youths”; the subset of 67 State Coun-
cil document words that match our five main attitudes of interest; and, the 1,166 most frequent
words in the Chinese language, taken from the Modern Chinese Frequency Dictionary. The percent
change in frequency is top-coded at 1,000; words appearing only in the new curriculum (with
percentage change equal to ∞) are assigned the top-code.
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Figure 3: Differences in means between students who studied the old curriculum and the new curriculum. The
bars show means for the relevant group of students in the 13 provinces with variation in curriculum in our sample.
Provinces are organized into three categories by the year when the new high school curriculum was introduced: either
2007, 2008, or 2009. 95% confidence intervals are indicated by lines. For comparison, the dots show means for the
corresponding cohorts within the set of provinces without variation in curriculum among the cohorts we study.
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Figure 4: Estimated effects of the new curriculum by students’ cohort relative to the introduction
of the new curriculum. Each figure shows coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from
regressions of each outcome category’s z-score (or individual survey question) on province and
cohort fixed effects, as well as a set of dummy variables indicating the timing of the student’s entry
to high school relative to the introduction of the new curriculum in his/her province. Standard
errors used to calculate the 95% confidence intervals are clustered at the province×cohort level.
The “<= −2” category entered two years or more before the first cohort exposed to the new
curriculum; the “−1” category was the final high school cohort under the old curriculum (and
this is the omitted category); the “1” category is the first cohort in a province that studied under
the new curriculum (i.e., the cohort entering high school immediately following the “‘-1” cohort);
and, the “>= 2” category includes students who were either the second cohort under the new
curriculum or beyond.
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Figure 5: Dot plot showing effect of the new curriculum on all questions within six broad cate-
gories of outcomes. Figure shows estimated coefficients on the NewCurriculum dummy variable
from a regression of the (standardized) outcome listed on NewCurriculum and province and co-
hort fixed effects. Coefficients are presented as absolute values; coefficients with positive signs are
denoted with closed symbols, while coefficients with negative signs are denoted with open sym-
bols (the sign of the coefficient is indicated in brackets as well). Figure also shows 95% confidence
intervals calculated using standard errors clustered at the province×cohort level (censored below
at 0) and p-values calculated using the false discovery rate procedure (in parentheses).
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Table 1: Changes in word counts for five broad categories of interest
Word Word Outcome Count in Count in Percent Change
in English in Chinese Category Old Curr. New Curr. in Frequency
Panel A: Categories of interest
Rule of Law 依法治国 Governance 0 10 ∞
Supervision 监督 Governance 30 116 225%
Election 选举 Political Institutions 2 120 4,948%
Democracy 民主 Political Institutions 11 282 2,057%
Market economy 市场经济 Economic Institutions 208 67 -73%
Socialism with 中国特色 Economic Institutions 4 97 1,940%
Chinese characteristics 社会主义
Chinese ethnic group 中华民族 Identity 1 100 8,313%
Homeland 祖国 Identity 1 51 4,191%
Environmental protection 环保 Environment 0 4 ∞
Sustainable development 可持续发展 Environment 0 3 ∞
Panel B: Comparison terms
Opening-up 对外开放 – 20 19 -20%
Domestic 国内 – 47 43 -23%
Region 地区 – 69 66 -20%
Resident 居民 – 48 54 -5%
Jiang Zemin 江泽民 – 0 4 ∞
Hu Jintao 胡锦涛 – 0 7 ∞
Note: Frequency equals the count of a word divided by the total number of words in the textbooks used in the new
or old curriculum. The old curriculum textbooks contained a total of 145,062 words; the new curriculum textbooks
contained a total of 172,424 words. Panel A shows counts of “key words” closely linked to the five broad categories
of attitudes on which we focus, by curriculum. Panel B shows analogous counts for political concepts that were not
focused on by the Chinese government; counts for “neutral” terms; and, counts for the names of political leaders
of China in the early 21st century who were not mentioned in the old textbooks. All terms come from the State
Council Document, “Suggestions on Strengthening the Ideological and Moral Construction of Our Youths,” issued
in 2004.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
All Old Curr. New Curr. Unconditional Conditional
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Mean Diff. p-value Diff. p-value
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Personal
Age 20.5 1.4 21.1 20.1 -1.0 0.000 -0.1 0.228
Height 169.6 8.2 169.3 169.8 0.5 0.172 0.1 0.949
Han 0.916 0.277 0.901 0.923 0.021 0.113 0.006 0.791
Female 0.459 0.498 0.441 0.467 0.026 0.277 -0.030 0.523
Urban 0.782 0.413 0.772 0.787 0.015 0.453 0.022 0.533
# of siblings 0.402 0.812 0.473 0.369 -0.105 0.008 -0.022 0.727
Panel B: Parents
Father high edu. 0.787 0.410 0.779 0.790 0.012 0.561 0.041 0.195
Father urban 0.744 0.436 0.737 0.748 0.012 0.583 -0.013 0.702
Father non-agri. 0.852 0.355 0.829 0.863 0.034 0.048 -0.002 0.941
Mother high edu. 0.727 0.446 0.696 0.741 0.045 0.040 0.048 0.155
Mother urban 0.745 0.436 0.737 0.748 0.012 0.583 0.007 0.848
Mother non-agri. 0.831 0.375 0.814 0.838 0.024 0.189 0.011 0.694
Parents in CCP 0.543 0.499 0.544 0.542 -0.002 0.931 -0.000 0.996
Panel C: Education
Taken gaokao 0.874 0.332 0.884 0.869 -0.015 0.361 -0.008 0.732
HS humanities track 0.308 0.462 0.314 0.304 -0.010 0.680 -0.020 0.583
Social science major 0.329 0.470 0.325 0.331 0.006 0.781 -0.013 0.697
Panel D: Politics
CCP Youth League member 0.981 0.135 0.982 0.981 -0.002 0.808 0.007 0.559
Panel E: New curriculum
New curriculum 0.683 0.465 0 1 1 — — —
Columns 5 and 6 report raw (unconditional) differences in means across curricula, and the p-value for a t-test of
differences in means. Columns 7 and 8 report differences conditional on cohort and province fixed effects. Number
of observations: 1954 (619 old curriculum, 1335 new curriculum).
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Table 3: Estimated effects of the new curriculum on all outcomes
FDR adj. Mean Std.Dev. Persuasion
beta s.e. p-value p-value dep.var. dep.var. rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Category: Governance
Panel A: Trust in government officials
Trust: central government 0.127 [0.054] 0.022 0.031 3.992 0.743 0.384
Trust: provincial government 0.126 [0.075] 0.093 0.060 3.627 0.763 0.197
Trust: local government 0.229 [0.069] 0.001 0.007 3.174 0.813 0.466
Trust: courts 0.078 [0.055] 0.154 0.084 3.640 0.746 0.132
Trust: armed forces 0.172 [0.064] 0.009 0.024 3.825 0.828 0.207
Trust: police 0.122 [0.070] 0.085 0.060 3.493 0.789 0.099
z-score index 0.247 [0.088] 0.006 — 0.014 0.986 —
Trust: non-governmental institutions -0.001 [0.093] 0.992 — 0.008 0.986 —
Panel B: Bribery and civic-mindedness
Village head is not self-interested 0.095 [0.061] 0.125 0.222 3.112 0.874 0.106
VH cares not only about rich 0.147 [0.053] 0.006 0.064 3.457 0.898 0.304
Bribes are not necessary: police 0.102 [0.069] 0.141 0.222 4.154 1.016 n/a
Bribes are not necessary: documents 0.112 [0.054] 0.040 0.220 4.430 0.835 0.168
Bribes are not necessary: courts 0.150 [0.095] 0.116 0.222 3.986 1.150 0.089
Bribes are not necessary: education 0.136 [0.086] 0.116 0.222 3.519 1.178 0.045
Bribes are not necessary: doctors -0.004 [0.105] 0.969 0.410 3.442 1.235 n/a
Bribes are not acceptable 0.018 [0.038] 0.637 0.314 0.685 0.465 0.055
Bribes are not effective 0.040 [0.026] 0.127 0.222 0.200 0.400 0.048
Officials would not accept bribes -0.002 [0.018] 0.914 0.410 0.056 0.230 n/a
z-score index 0.161 [0.065] 0.015 — -0.001 0.999 —
Category: Political Institutions
Panel C: Perception of Chinese democracy
How democratic is China 0.246 [0.122] 0.047 0.025 5.200 1.678 0.175
People can influence elections 0.199 [0.078] 0.012 0.025 3.206 0.972 0.279
z-score index 0.213 [0.074] 0.004 — 0.010 0.994 —
Panel D: Wisdom of the masses
People cannot judge VH 0.244 [0.079] 0.003 0.016 2.425 0.908 0.418
People should not influence elections 0.021 [0.063] 0.735 0.462 1.719 0.710 0.006
People do not know better leaders 0.020 [0.073] 0.789 0.462 2.350 0.902 0.021
Democracy is not always preferred 0.074 [0.042] 0.085 0.132 0.690 0.462 0.205
China is not suitable for democracy 0.225 [0.162] 0.169 0.204 4.970 1.779 0.063
z-score index 0.164 [0.089] 0.067 — -0.009 0.992 —
Panel E: Characteristics of democracy
Participation is key for democracy 0.048 [0.034] 0.155 — 0.394 0.489 0.076
Category: Economic Institutions
Panel F: Skeptical of markets
Continued on next page
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FDR adj. Mean Std.Dev. Persuasion
beta s.e. p-value p-value dep.var. dep.var. rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Skeptical of markets 0.087 [0.041] 0.034 — 0.697 0.460 0.240
Category: Identity
Panel G: Ethnic identity
Trust towards minorities -0.096 [0.050] 0.059 0.134 3.581 0.728 n/a
Han and minorities are similar 0.062 [0.040] 0.126 0.134 0.787 0.410 0.242
Han and minorities share heritage -0.005 [0.030] 0.866 0.277 0.185 0.388 n/a
Willing to marry minority 0.054 [0.026] 0.040 0.134 0.849 0.359 0.288
z-score index 0.063 [0.075] 0.401 — 0.010 0.993 —
Panel H: National identity
Identity: Chinese 0.053 [0.081] 0.510 — 3.553 0.710 0.079
Category: Environment
Panel I: Attitudes about environment
Support environment spending -0.033 [0.021] 0.108 0.480 0.933 0.250 n/a
Environment as policy priority -0.034 [0.028] 0.219 0.480 0.115 0.320 n/a
Environment vs. growth -0.034 [0.044] 0.446 0.480 0.695 0.461 n/a
z-score index -0.162 [0.099] 0.104 — 0.005 1.004 —
Category: Behavior
Panel J: Political behavior
Voted for PCR in the past -0.035 [0.045] 0.437 0.852 0.461 0.499 n/a
Plan to vote for PCR 0.006 [0.051] 0.906 1.000 0.490 0.500 0.012
Member of CCP 0.027 [0.035] 0.431 0.852 0.266 0.442 0.037
Participation in political groups 0.029 [0.018] 0.115 0.852 0.058 0.234 0.030
z-score index 0.082 [0.092] 0.376 — 0.001 1.002 —
Panel K: Avoiding risky investment
Not invested in stocks 0.055 [0.025] 0.032 0.069 0.895 0.307 0.386
Not invested in bonds 0.026 [0.016] 0.102 0.069 0.965 0.183 0.495
z-score index 0.207 [0.074] 0.006 — 0.004 1.001 —
Panel L: Cooperation with minority
Cooperated with minority 0.002 [0.032] 0.957 — 0.841 0.366 0.011
All regressions include a full set of province and cohort fixed effects (not reported). Robust standard errors in brack-
ets, clustered at the province×cohort level. The z-score index (weighting by the inverse covariance of the standard-
izes outcomes) and the FDR-adjusted p-values are computed following Anderson (2008). For non-binary dependent
variables, persuasion rates are based on the binary analogue (a dummy taking the value 1 for outcomes above the
median value) Persuasion rates are not calculated when outcomes did not move in the direction desired by the Chi-
nese government or when the median value of the outcome equals the maximum possible value of the outcome.
47
T
ab
le
4:
R
o
b
u
st
n
es
s
o
f
b
as
el
in
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
D
ep
en
d
en
t
v
ar
ia
b
le
:
A:Trustin
govt.officials
B:Bribery
andcivic-
mindedness
C:Perception
ofChinese
democracy
D:Wisdomof
themasses
E:Characteristics
ofdemocracy
F:Skepticalof
markets
G:Ethnic
identity
H:National
identity
I:Attitudesabout
environment
J:Political
behavior
K:Avoidrisky
investment
L:Cooperation
withminority
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
P
an
el
A
:B
as
el
in
e
N
ew
C
u
rr
ic
u
lu
m
0.
24
7
0.
16
1
0.
21
3
0.
16
4
0.
04
8
0.
08
7
0.
06
3
0.
05
3
-0
.1
62
0.
08
2
0.
20
7
0.
00
2
[0
.0
88
]
[0
.0
65
]
[0
.0
74
]
[0
.0
89
]
[0
.0
34
]
[0
.0
41
]
[0
.0
75
]
[0
.0
81
]
[0
.0
99
]
[0
.0
92
]
[0
.0
74
]
[0
.0
32
]
p
-v
al
u
e
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
67
)
(0
.1
55
)
(0
.0
34
)
(0
.4
01
)
(0
.5
10
)
(0
.1
04
)
(0
.3
76
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.9
57
)
(w
il
d
bo
ot
st
ra
p
p-
va
lu
e)
(0
.0
62
)
(0
.0
48
)
(0
.0
30
)
(0
.1
90
)
(0
.2
58
)
(0
.0
74
)
(0
.5
50
)
(0
.5
68
)
(0
.1
66
)
(0
.4
80
)
(0
.0
54
)
(0
.9
26
)
P
an
el
B
:W
it
h
in
di
vi
du
al
-l
ev
el
co
n
tr
ol
s
N
ew
C
u
rr
ic
u
lu
m
0.
24
3
0.
16
3
0.
19
4
0.
16
9
0.
04
4
0.
08
0
0.
07
4
0.
05
7
-0
.1
56
0.
10
7
0.
19
5
0.
00
5
[0
.0
84
]
[0
.0
66
]
[0
.0
73
]
[0
.0
89
]
[0
.0
33
]
[0
.0
40
]
[0
.0
73
]
[0
.0
80
]
[0
.1
02
]
[0
.0
92
]
[0
.0
72
]
[0
.0
30
]
P
an
el
C
:W
it
h
pr
ov
in
ce
×
co
ho
rt
-l
ev
el
co
n
tr
ol
s
N
ew
C
u
rr
ic
u
lu
m
0.
24
8
0.
16
4
0.
21
6
0.
15
9
0.
05
0
0.
08
5
0.
06
0
0.
06
2
-0
.1
60
0.
09
0
0.
20
9
0.
00
4
[0
.0
88
]
[0
.0
67
]
[0
.0
74
]
[0
.0
89
]
[0
.0
33
]
[0
.0
39
]
[0
.0
75
]
[0
.0
71
]
[0
.0
98
]
[0
.0
85
]
[0
.0
74
]
[0
.0
31
]
P
an
el
D
:C
on
tr
ol
li
n
g
fo
r
20
03
pr
ov
in
ci
al
G
R
P
×
co
ho
rt
F
E
s
N
ew
C
u
rr
ic
u
lu
m
0.
26
2
0.
12
5
0.
15
9
0.
19
6
0.
04
6
0.
08
4
0.
09
8
0.
07
2
-0
.0
88
0.
16
8
0.
19
9
-0
.0
11
[0
.0
97
]
[0
.0
73
]
[0
.0
79
]
[0
.0
97
]
[0
.0
38
]
[0
.0
41
]
[0
.0
83
]
[0
.0
78
]
[0
.1
11
]
[0
.0
91
]
[0
.0
83
]
[0
.0
35
]
P
an
el
E
:P
ro
vi
n
ce
-s
pe
ci
fi
c
co
ho
rt
tr
en
ds
N
ew
C
u
rr
ic
u
lu
m
0.
22
1
0.
20
9
0.
11
8
0.
31
1
0.
06
8
0.
09
0
-0
.0
00
0.
17
1
-0
.1
14
-0
.0
24
0.
27
2
0.
02
1
[0
.0
95
]
[0
.0
88
]
[0
.0
74
]
[0
.1
21
]
[0
.0
39
]
[0
.0
50
]
[0
.0
87
]
[0
.0
82
]
[0
.1
15
]
[0
.1
00
]
[0
.0
99
]
[0
.0
30
]
M
ea
n
D
V
0.
01
4
-0
.0
01
0.
01
0
-0
.0
09
0.
39
4
0.
69
7
0.
01
0
3.
55
3
0.
00
5
0.
00
1
0.
00
4
0.
84
1
S
td
.D
ev
.D
V
0.
98
6
0.
99
9
0.
99
4
0.
99
2
0.
48
9
0.
46
0
0.
99
3
0.
71
0
1.
00
4
1.
00
2
1.
00
1
0.
36
6
A
ll
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
in
cl
u
d
e
a
fu
ll
se
t
o
f
p
ro
v
in
ce
an
d
co
h
o
rt
fi
x
ed
ef
fe
ct
s
(n
o
t
re
p
o
rt
ed
).
P
an
el
B
co
n
tr
o
ls
fo
r
th
e
in
d
iv
id
u
al
an
d
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
re
p
o
rt
ed
in
P
an
el
s
A
–D
o
f
T
ab
le
2
(e
x
ce
p
t
fo
r
th
e
h
ig
h
sc
h
o
o
l
tr
ac
k
).
P
an
el
C
co
n
tr
o
ls
fo
r
sp
en
d
in
g
o
n
se
co
n
d
ar
y
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
at
th
e
p
ro
v
in
ce
×
co
h
o
rt
le
v
el
.
P
an
el
D
in
cl
u
d
es
an
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
b
et
w
ee
n
a
p
ro
v
in
ce
’s
g
ro
ss
re
g
io
n
al
p
ro
d
u
ct
in
20
03
an
d
a
fu
ll
se
t
o
f
co
h
o
rt
fi
x
ed
ef
fe
ct
s.
P
an
el
E
in
cl
u
d
es
a
co
h
o
rt
tr
en
d
in
te
ra
ct
ed
w
it
h
a
fu
ll
se
t
o
f
p
ro
v
in
ce
fi
x
ed
ef
fe
ct
s.
R
o
b
u
st
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
b
ra
ck
et
s,
cl
u
st
er
ed
at
th
e
p
ro
v
in
ce
×
co
h
o
rt
le
v
el
.
T
h
e
w
il
d
b
o
o
ts
tr
ap
p
-v
al
u
e
is
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
al
lo
w
in
g
fo
r
cl
u
st
er
in
g
at
th
e
p
ro
v
in
ce
le
v
el
.
M
ed
ia
n
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
ac
ro
ss
co
lu
m
n
s:
17
05
(P
an
el
A
,P
an
el
s
C
–E
);
14
87
(P
an
el
B
).
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
cl
u
st
er
s:
11
6
(2
9
w
it
h
w
il
d
b
o
o
ts
tr
ap
).
48
T
ab
le
5:
S
el
ec
ti
o
n
in
to
th
e
su
rv
ey
an
d
in
to
P
ek
in
g
U
n
iv
er
si
ty
D
ep
en
d
en
t
v
ar
ia
b
le
:
A:Trustin
govt.officials
B:Bribery
andcivic-
mindedness
C:Perception
ofChinese
democracy
D:Wisdomof
themasses
E:Characteristics
ofdemocracy
F:Skepticalof
markets
G:Ethnic
identity
H:National
identity
I:Attitudesabout
environment
J:Political
behavior
K:Avoidrisky
investment
L:Cooperation
withminority
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
P
an
el
A
:B
as
el
in
e
N
ew
C
u
rr
ic
u
lu
m
0.
24
7
0.
16
1
0.
21
3
0.
16
4
0.
04
8
0.
08
7
0.
06
3
0.
05
3
-0
.1
62
0.
08
2
0.
20
7
0.
00
2
[0
.0
88
]
[0
.0
65
]
[0
.0
74
]
[0
.0
89
]
[0
.0
34
]
[0
.0
41
]
[0
.0
75
]
[0
.0
81
]
[0
.0
99
]
[0
.0
92
]
[0
.0
74
]
[0
.0
32
]
P
an
el
B
:F
ol
lo
w
-u
p
su
rv
ey
on
ly
N
ew
C
u
rr
ic
u
lu
m
0.
17
1
0.
19
6
0.
26
6
-0
.3
72
-0
.0
02
0.
08
5
0.
44
1
-0
.1
87
-0
.1
49
-0
.1
26
0.
03
2
0.
02
3
[0
.2
35
]
[0
.1
70
]
[0
.3
00
]
[0
.3
06
]
[0
.0
99
]
[0
.1
06
]
[0
.2
18
]
[0
.1
66
]
[0
.2
55
]
[0
.1
98
]
[0
.2
08
]
[0
.0
92
]
P
an
el
C
:S
ci
en
ce
tr
ac
k
st
u
de
n
ts
on
ly
N
ew
C
u
rr
ic
u
lu
m
0.
30
4
0.
23
8
0.
21
2
0.
14
4
0.
12
8
0.
03
6
0.
12
9
0.
10
8
-0
.1
20
0.
04
8
0.
14
9
-0
.0
15
[0
.0
99
]
[0
.0
88
]
[0
.1
02
]
[0
.1
03
]
[0
.0
47
]
[0
.0
56
]
[0
.1
01
]
[0
.1
00
]
[0
.1
14
]
[0
.1
32
]
[0
.0
92
]
[0
.0
44
]
P
an
el
D
:H
u
m
an
it
ie
s
tr
ac
k
st
u
de
n
ts
on
ly
N
ew
C
u
rr
ic
u
lu
m
0.
45
4
0.
26
4
0.
51
3
0.
20
7
-0
.0
50
0.
20
9
-0
.0
15
-0
.1
05
0.
02
2
0.
22
0
0.
33
6
0.
09
3
[0
.1
50
]
[0
.1
45
]
[0
.1
69
]
[0
.1
71
]
[0
.0
72
]
[0
.0
71
]
[0
.1
49
]
[0
.1
01
]
[0
.1
50
]
[0
.1
65
]
[0
.1
56
]
[0
.0
53
]
A
ll
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
in
cl
u
d
e
a
fu
ll
se
t
o
f
p
ro
v
in
ce
an
d
co
h
o
rt
fi
x
ed
ef
fe
ct
s
(n
o
t
re
p
o
rt
ed
).
R
o
b
u
st
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
b
ra
ck
et
s,
cl
u
st
er
ed
at
th
e
p
ro
v
in
ce
×
co
h
o
rt
le
v
el
.
M
ed
ia
n
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
ac
ro
ss
co
lu
m
n
s:
32
9.
5
(P
an
el
B
);
10
41
(P
an
el
C
);
45
5
(P
an
el
D
).
M
ed
ia
n
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
cl
u
st
er
s
ac
ro
ss
co
lu
m
n
s:
81
.5
(P
an
el
B
);
11
5
(P
an
el
C
);
11
0
(P
an
el
D
).
49
Table 6: Additional tests: identifying textbooks, factual knowledge, and teaching practices
Factual knowledge
Dependent variable: N
ew
te
x
tb
o
o
k
co
v
er
A
w
ar
e:
V
H
el
ec
te
d
A
w
ar
e:
ab
le
to
v
o
te
P
C
R
z-
sc
o
re
in
d
ex
(F
ac
tu
al
k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e)
z-
sc
o
re
in
d
ex
(T
ea
ch
in
g
st
y
le
)
T
ea
ch
in
g
fo
cu
se
d
o
n
ga
ok
ao
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
New Curriculum 0.865 0.079 0.038 0.198 -0.007 0.108
[0.015] [0.034] [0.028] [0.075] [0.083] [0.069]
Observations 1,691 1,754 1,755 1,754 1,691 1,691
Mean DV 0.659 0.770 0.870 0.006 -0.007 1.937
Std.Dev. DV 0.474 0.421 0.336 0.997 1.004 0.867
All regressions include a full set of province and cohort fixed effects (not re-
ported). Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the province×cohort
level.
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ONLINE APPENDICES, NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Appendix A The Chinese high school curriculum
All students in the first year of senior high school take the same courses in languages (Chinese
and English), math, science, and social studies (Politics, History, and Geography). Students then
choose to specialize in either the science track or the humanities track. The choice of track de-
termines both students’ coursework in the last two years of senior high school, and the content
on which they will be tested in the high-stakes National Higher Education Entrance Examination,
known as the gaokao (as seen in Figure A.1). In our empirical analysis below, we focus on changes
to the tenth grade Politics textbooks for senior high school students, before the track split. All
students face an examination on the Politics curriculum that is a component of their university
admissions process: students in the science track are examined on the content of the first year
Politics textbook in the “little gaokao” during eleventh grade, while students in the humanities
track are examined on this material in the (very high stakes) gaokao exam at the end of senior high
school.
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Figure A.1: The Chinese secondary education system
A.1
Appendix B Textbooks
B.1 New curriculum introduction dates by province
In Table B.1, we show for each province the high school entry cohort to which the new curriculum
was introduced. We also provide an official source that indicates the introduction date for each
province.
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B.2 Textbook covers
1. Old politics textbook
“Senior High School Politics (Module A)”, People’s Education Press.
2. New politics textbook
“Senior High School New Curriculum Standard Politics (Module 1): Economic Life”, People’s Ed-
ucation Press.
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B.3 A few words on the new senior high school Politics textbook, from the author
(2009)
In July 2009, the chair of the committee in charge of rewriting the Politics textbook, Tian Xinming,
who was appointed by the Ministry of Education, published an essay on his thoughts on the
new textbook.1 To our knowledge, this is the only example of the author of a Chinese textbook
reflecting on how he wrote the textbook. The following are translated excerpts:
The new textbook features two prominent characteristics: First, it unequivocally upholds the
correct political and ideological point of view, as well as Marxist education. Second, it reflects
the basic concepts of the curriculum reform, focusing on guiding the learning process.
. . .
We believe that high school students are at an age of rapid development and transformation
of their own political ideology. Since the founding of the [People’s Republic of China], many
years of experience has shown that the high school Politics curriculum may have a profound
impact on the students’ entire lives. The Politics textbook is the spiritual material that the
country provides for the students. Writing the Politics textbook is an act at the state level,
rather than an academic activity of the individual author. Although the high school Politics
textbook teaches very basic knowledge, it possesses extremely strong political, policy-oriented,
and scientific characteristics. With a large readership, it will influence an entire generation of
young people.
. . .
The Education Ministry has explicitly indicated to us that the fundamental goal for the Pol-
itics curriculum is to educate students in morality and ideology. Similar to other subjects, it
also teaches students knowledge and equips students with skills. However, its fundamental
characteristic is that it is a curriculum designed for moral and ideological education. This is
the major difference between the Politics curriculum and other subjects. Whether it is writing
the textbook or teaching the material at school, we must tightly uphold this curriculum’s basic
feature and fundamental goal. Otherwise, we will go in the wrong direction.
. . .
[Regarding new material that needed to be covered in the textbook.] The CCP’s basic guiding
principles, which are explicitly summarized and stated in the Party’s 15th congress: namely,
the basic goals and policies of the construction of the Socialist economy, politics, and culture
with Chinese characteristics. This is the expansion of the CCP’s basic roadmap, and the cur-
riculum needs to accurately reflect this. After the Party’s 16th congress, the CCP introduced
the strategic ideology of a harmonious society. These ideas must also be promptly reflected in
the new curriculum, and become a part of the moral and ideological educational content.
. . .
In order to write the textbook well, we must maintain a correct and clear understanding of
the current ideological and political situation. The overall situation of China’s ideological the-
ory field is good. The mainstream is positive and healthy. However, the ideological field is
not peaceful. There exist noises: ideological struggles and competition; foreign hostile forces’
attempts to westernize or separate China. This would be reflected in the textbook writing pro-
cess.
1The original text in its entirety can be found at
http://www.pep.com.cn/sxzz/js/tbjx/kb/jsys/bx1/201008/t20100830 824446.htm.
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Appendix C Government documents
C.1 Summary of government documents consulted
1. “Decision on Deepening the Education Reform, and Comprehensively Promoting the ‘Quality-
oriented Education”’2
Issued by the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, in June 1999. This document marks
the beginning of the planning phase of the 8th Curriculum Reform. It emphasizes that education
is essential to China’s continuous growth during 21st century, and that its education policy needs
substantial reform. In particular, the document calls for a reform of the curriculum structure and
content.
2. “Framework for Basic Education Reform” 3
Issued by the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China, in June 2001. In this doc-
ument, the Ministry delineates the motivation and objectives for the coming curriculum reform.
This document also specifies that the corresponding “curriculum framework” would be set up to
support the implementation of these new educational objectives.
3. “Strengthening the Ideological and Moral Construction of the Youth” 4
Issued by the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, in February 2004. The memo spec-
ifies the particular political and moral education objectives that should be achieved through the
high school “Politics” curriculum. Note that while the Ministry of Education’s “curriculum frame-
work” guided writing of the high school textbooks for all subjects, the “Politics” subject is unique
in the sense that it is guided by this additional memo issued by the State Council.
4. “Curriculum Framework for the Senior High School Politics Subject” 5
Issued by the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China, in March 2004. This doc-
ument describes the specific goals of the curriculum, as well as the key items that the curriculum
would cover. The document serves as the guiding framework for textbook authors, high school
teachers, exam preparation book publishers, as well as students.
C.2 Translated excerpts of relevant government documents
1. State Council’s “Decision on Deepening the Education Reform, and Comprehensively Pro-
moting the ‘Quality-oriented Education’” (1999)
Education is at the fundamental position of a nation’s power accumulation process. Whether a
nation is powerful or not increasingly depends on its labor force’s human capital – the number
and quality of various types of labor forces. This poses a more urgent demand for China to
2The original document can be found at http://www.moe.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/moe_
177/200407/2478.html.
3The original document can be found at http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2002/content_61386.htm.
4The original document can be found at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jiaoyu/1053/2405224.html.
5The original document can be found at http://www.moe.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/moe_
711/201001/78375.html.
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grow and train a new generation suitable for the 21st century. . . . During the 50 years since the
founding of the PRC, especially since the “Reform and Opening-up” in 1978, China’s education
reform and development have witnessed outstanding achievements. However, in this new era,
due to various reasons, we are falling behind in terms of our education philosophy, education
system and institutions, students’ training models, education content, and education methods.
This negatively affects the overall development of youths, and is not suitable for the needs of
enhancing our citizens’ characters and qualities.
2. Ministry of Education’s “Framework for Basic Education Reform” (2001)
In this document, the ministry delineates the motivation and the objectives for the future curricu-
lar reforms. The previous basic educational curriculum, it is said, cannot satisfy the needs of development
in this new age. Thus, a new curriculum should meet the following objectives (in the order of
appearance in the original document): it should reflect the times, and make students patriotic, com-
munitarian, [and] love socialism. Students should inherit and carry forward the great traditions of the
Chinese nation and its revolution; and be equipped with an awareness of the legal system under a so-
cialist democracy. The new curriculum should promote compliance with national laws and with societal
ethics, and gradually form in students a correct worldview, a correct view of life, and a correct value system.
A “National Curriculum Framework” was set up in order to support the implementation of the
new educational objectives. The June, 2001, document describes the Framework as the guideline for
the drafting of textbooks, for the development of learning activities, and for assessment and examinations.
It is the basis for centralized curriculum management and evaluation. Some of the objectives of the
education reforms are reaffirmed when describing the Framework; the document indicates that
the development of the curriculum framework should, according to the specific content of each
subject area, strengthen ideological education with respect to its relevance, effectiveness, and
ability to motivate; it should educate students in patriotism, communitarianism, and socialism;
it should increase education in the great traditions of the Chinese nation; it should increase
revolutionary and national defense education; it should strengthen thought quality and moral
education; it should guide students to establish a correct worldview, a correct view on life,
and a correct value system; it should advocate a scientific spirit and attitude, and the scientific
method, guiding students toward innovation and practice.
3. State Council’s memo of “Strengthening the Ideological and Moral Construction of the
Youth” (2004)
The main tasks and goals of the ideological and moral construction of our youths are:
1. Beginning with strengthening the love of country, promote and foster patriotism as the
core of our great national character. Thoroughly carry out the education of the fine tra-
ditions of the Chinese nation, the Chinese revolutionary traditions, and Chinese history,
especially modern history. Guide the vast numbers of youths to recognize the history and
traditions of the Chinese nation and to understand the grave national disasters and the
heroic struggles of the Chinese people in modern times. Establish from a young age a
sense of national self-esteem, confidence and pride.
2. Beginning with the setting of broad aspirations for the youths, foster and cultivate in
them correct ideals and beliefs. Carry out education on the history of China’s revolution,
nation building, and “The Reform and Opening-up.” Guide the vast numbers of youths
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to correctly recognize the patterns of social development, to correctly recognize the na-
tion’s future and destiny; integrating individual growth with the great cause of socialism
with Chinese characteristics, and with the prosperity and power of the homeland. Pre-
pare the youths for taking on the honorable mission of building China and revitalizing
China.
3. Beginning with the regulation of youths’ behavior and habits, develop in them good
moral character and civil conduct. Intensely promote basic codes of ethics: “patriotism
and respect for the law; civility and honesty; unity and friendship; diligence, frugality
and self-reliance; and professional dedication.” Promote communitarianism and socialist
humanitarianism. Guide the vast numbers of youths to firmly establish a place in their
heart for the homeland, for the community, and for other people; to understand the basic
principles of conduct; and to be equipped with the basic upbringing necessary for living
a civilized life. Teach the youths how to handle interpersonal relationships, the relation-
ship between the individual and society, and the relationship between the individual and
the natural world.
4. Beginning with improvements in the development of character, promote the overall de-
velopment of young people. Strive to cultivate in youths a work ethic, creativity, effi-
ciency, and environmental awareness; an enterprising spirit, a scientific mind, and an
awareness of democracy and the rule of law. Enhance the development of young people’s
practical skills, autonomy, and the ability to protect themselves; guide them so that they
maintain their vitality, their exuberance, their high-spirited yearning for self-betterment;
encourage them to study diligently, to implement boldly, and to dare to create; com-
prehensively improve their ideological and moral character, their scientific and cultural
literacy, and their physical health.
School is the primary channel for transmitting ideological and moral education to young
people. We must follow the party’s education policy, and prioritize ideological and moral
education among all general education goals, and throughout all aspects of education
and teaching activities. We should place extremely high importance on the cultivation
of a national spirit, incorporating this throughout the primary and secondary education
experience.
4. Ministry of Education’s “Curriculum Framework for Senior High School Politics Subject”
(2004)
The goals of the Politics subject:
1. Knowledge:
• Know that the Chinese Communist Party has always represented the development
trend of China’s advanced productive forces, the orientation of China’s advanced
culture, and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese
people.
• Understand the meaning of developing socialist market economy, the socialist democ-
racy, and the socialist advanced culture.
• Know the principles and the basic methodology of materialism and historical mate-
rialism.
• Understand contemporary China’s basic needs for moral construction among its cit-
izens, as well as the establishment of China’s rule of law.
• Obtain the relevant knowledge in order to make the correct decisions regarding ca-
reer development.
2. Abilities:
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• Enhance the ability to use Marxist principles and methodology to solve real issues.
Be able to make the correct value judgment and behavior choices.
• Enhance the ability to actively participate in economic, political, and cultural activi-
ties.
• Enhance the ability to correctly handle the relationship between competition and
cooperation in the society.
• Foster the ability to individually and voluntarily study, choose, and discover.
• Enhance the ability to do everything in accordance to the law: constrain self conduct
according to the law, and use law to protect own rights and interests.
• Develop the ability to collect and filter societal information using multiple methods,
especially the modern information technology.
3. Sentiments, Attitudes, and Values:
• Love the Chinese Communist Party. Be persistent in the belief in the socialist devel-
opment path with Chinese characteristics.
• Love the nation, love its people. Pay close attention to the destiny of the nation.
Enhance the self-esteem, self-confidence, and pride of the Chinese nation. Be willing
to promote the Chinese ethnic spirit. Establish the ambition to strive for the revival
of the Chinese nation.
• Pay close attention to social development. Take initiative in participating in social
activities. Be honest, faithful, and trustworthy. Enhance social responsibilities. Con-
tinue to establish perspectives and concepts of democracy and the rule of law. Foster
the idea of citizenship.
• Love the community. Be devoted to the society. Care for others, and be willing to
help others. Foster the spirits of cooperation and friendliness.
• Love to study. Respect science. Chase after truth. Obtain the scientific attitudes and
innovation spirits.
• Love life. Take initiative to engage in healthy cultural activities. Maintain an upbeat
spirit, and aim for higher moral goals.
• Love peace. Respect for the diverse ethnic culture around the globe. Pay close atten-
tion to the common interests of all mankind. Foster a global perspective.
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C.3 Search words relating to five major categories of attitude change, taken from the
2004 State Council memo
In our quantitative analysis of the old and new Politics textbooks, we examined the frequency of 67
words found in the State Council’s memo, “Strengthening the Ideological and Moral Construction
of the Youth” (2004), which were related to the five attitudes on which we focus. The 67 words are
provided in Table C.2, below.
Table C.2: Search words (five main categories)
Word Word Count in Count in Percent Change
in English in Chinese Old Curr. New Curr. in Frequency
Party 党 33 250 537%
Homeland 祖国 1 51 4,191%
Socialism with 中国特色 4 97 1,940%
Chinese characteristics 社会主义
Our country 我国 429 512 0.4%
Chinese ethnic group 中国民族 1 100 8,313%
Nation 国家 508 648 7%
Ethnicity 民族 19 500 2,114%
Inheritance 传统 8 117 1,130%
Fine tradition 党 1 4 237%
Socialism 社会主义 246 440 50%
Moderately prosperous society 小康社会 0 26 ∞
Patriotism 爱国主义 2 21 783%
Citizen 公民 55 184 181%
Environment 环境 10 52 337%
Unity 团结 5 49 724%
China 中国 207 614 150%
Market economy 市场经济 208 67 -73%
Develop 发展 624 773 4%
Economic sectors 经济成分 0 2 ∞
Organizational structure 组织形式 5 6 1%
Employment 就业 21 56 124%
Interest 利益 58 164 138%
Abuse of power 以权谋私 1 1 -16%
Corruption 腐败 0 3 ∞
Culture 文化 46 1174 2,047%
Minority 少数 6 41 475%
Great revival 伟大复兴 0 10 ∞
Revival 复兴 0 13 ∞
Scientific view of development 科学发展观 0 19 ∞
People-oriented 以人为本 0 4 ∞
Rule for the people 执政为民 0 4 ∞
Participate 参与 22 156 497%
Discuss 讨论 6 21 194%
Unification 统一 42 78 56%
Law 法律 81 118 23%
Administration 行政 39 74 60%
Nationalist 爱国 2 44 1,751%
Continued on next page
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History 历史 28 134 497%
Citizens 人民 221 635 142%
Ethnic pride 民族自尊 0 2 ∞
Reform & Opening-up 改革开放 22 25 -4%
Law-abiding 守法 4 9 89%
Democracy 民主 11 282 2,057%
Legal institution 法制 22 156 497%
Engage in 参加 35 63 51%
Law compliance 遵纪守法 2 3 26%
Election 选举 2 120 4,948%
Civil administration 民政 3 15 321%
Civil participation 决策 8 103 983%
Party and govt bodies 党政机关 0 1 ∞
Government 政府 55 301 360%
Legislation 法规 27 43 34%
Legal 合法 56 42 -37%
Green 绿色 0 13 ∞
The people’s government 人民政府 2 5 110%
Focus on 关注 1 17 1,330%
Characteristics 特色 9 125 1,068%
Organizations of the masses 人民团体 0 1 ∞
Fulfill (duty) 履行 21 53 112%
Illegal 非法 5 10 68%
According to the law 依法 57 88 30%
Politics 政治 30 328 820%
Common 共同 61 143 97%
Police 公安 2 5 110%
Democratic parties 民主党派 0 24 ∞
Without party affiliation 无党派 0 3 ∞
Maintain 维护 33 103 163%
The entire party 全党 0 2 ∞
Frequency equals the count of a word divided by the total number of words in the textbooks in the new or
old curriculum. The old curriculum textbooks contained a total of 145,062 words; the new curriculum text-
books contained a total of 172,424 words. All terms come from the State Council Document, “Suggestions
on Strengthening the Ideological and Moral Construction of Our Youths,” issued in 2004. Terms are listed
in the order of appearance in the State Council Document.
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Appendix D Government’s aims, changes in the curriculum, and changes
in the gaokao framework
D.1 Governance
• State Council (1999): mentions “the rule of law” as one of the main goals of moral education
at school.
• Ministry of Education (2001): the new curriculum should make students understand the
principle of “the rule of law.”
• State Council (2004): emphasizes that “the rule of law” should be integrated into the school
curriculum.
• Ministry of Education (2004): one of the main objectives of the curriculum is to make stu-
dents understand the “basic requirement of legal system construction in contemporary China.”
Also, the new curriculum shall establish students’ sentiment of “loving CCP and the nation.”
The framework adds several sections related to the rule of law. For example, “government
should exercise its power and duties according to law,” “government’s power shall be super-
vised, and government should not abuse its power.” The framework also adds sections re-
lated to supervision of the government, such as “citizens’ responsibility to participate in gov-
ernment supervision,” “government’s power shall be supervised, and government should
not abuse its power.”
• Added sections in the new curriculum:
– “Various methods of democratic supervision”
– “Responsible exercise of the supervision right”
– “A government that benefits its people”
– “Ways to seek help; legal channels to voice complaints”
– “The specific requirements for government to adhere to the rule of law”
– “The significance of restricting and supervising government’s power”
– “Cheers for the ‘Sunshine Project’ [local government operational transparency project]”
– “End-of-chapter research topic: where does the government’s authority come from?”
• Added items in the new gaokao framework:
– Chinese citizens’ rights of democratic supervision
– The legal channels to conduct democratic supervision
– Citizens need to exercise the right of democratic supervision in a responsible manner
– The duties of the Chinese government
– The fundamental guidelines of the Chinese government; the basic principles of govern-
ment operations
– The significance and requirement of the rule of law
– To improve the government’s ability to adhere to the rule of law
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– The significance of restricting and supervising government’s power
– China’s administrative supervision system
– The origin and establishment of the Chinese government’s authority
D.2 Political institutions
• State Council (1999): mentions “(socialist) democracy” as a goal of moral education at school.
• Ministry of Education (2001): Specifies that to equip students with the ideas of “socialist
democracy” is one of the main objectives of the new curriculum.
• State Council (2004): To establish the consciousness of “(socialist) democracy” is one of the
main objectives of moral construction.
• Ministry of Education (2004): a main goal of the curriculum is to make students understand
the meaning of “socialist democracy.” Also, the curriculum is to “enhance students’ ability
to actively participate in political life.” The framework also adds related sections such as
“citizens’ participation in political life,” “rights and duties of political participation”, etc.
• Added sections in the new curriculum:
– “Main components of political life”
– “How to participate in political life”
– “The choice of election methods and its basis”
– “Various ways of participating in democratic decision-making”
– “The importance of citizens’ direct participation in democratic decision-making”
– “The most comprehensive democratic practices in China”
– “End-of-chapter research topic: orderly and disorderly political participation”
• Added items in the new Gaokao framework:
– Basic principles and content of Chinese citizens participating in political life
– Channels for Chinese citizens to participate in political life
– China’s election system and method
– Various ways for citizens to participate in democratic decision-making
– The significance of citizens directly participating in democratic decision-making
– The meaning and significance of Chinese villages and urban dwellers governing them-
selves
D.3 Economic institutions
• State Council (1999): not mentioned.
• Ministry of Education (2001): not mentioned.
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• State Council (2004): the document states that “the moral education of the youth should
correspond to the reality of the socialist market economy.”
• Ministry of Education (2004): the document specifies that one of main goals of the cur-
riculum is to make students understand the meaning of “socialist market economy.” The
framework also adds sections such as “the role government plays in market activities,” “one
cannot construct the socialist market economy without the state’s macro-adjustment and
intervention.”
• Added and modified sections in the new curriculum:
– “Limitations of market allocation of resources”
– “Basic characteristics of the socialist market economy”
– “Strengthening the state’s macroeconomic regulations and controls”
– “Functions of fiscal policies”
– “How to correctly utilize fiscal policies”
– “The concept of public goods”
• Added and modified items in the new gaokao framework:
– Market adjustment and its limitations
– Market allocation of resources
– Basic characteristics of the socialist market economy
– Public finance and infrastructure construction
– Public finance and macroeconomic regulations and controls
– Public finance and the guarantee of people’s living standards
D.4 Identity
• State Council (1999): specifies that teaching “multi-ethnic harmony” is a goal of moral ed-
ucation at school. Also states goal of teaching students about “China’s fine traditions” and
China’s place in international affairs.
• Ministry of Education (2001): the document mentions that one of the main objectives of the
new curriculum is to make students become proud of their Chinese cultural heritage.
• State Council (2004): the document mentions several times the importance of educating
youth regarding Chinese cultural and ethnic heritage. It also states that moral education
needs to establish the sentiment of Chinese ethnic pride among the youth.
• Ministry of Education (2004): specifies Chinese ethnic pride as one of the main objectives of
the new curriculum.
• Added and modified sections in the new curriculum:
– “Principles of dealing with relationships among ethnic groups: equality, unity, and all
prosperous together”
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– “The eternal Chinese ethnic spirit”
– “Promoting the Chinese ethnic spirit”
• Added and modified items in the new Gaokao framework:
– The basic principles of dealing with multi-ethnic relationships in China
– The inclusiveness of the Chinese culture
– Each ethnic group contributes to the Chinese culture
– The core of the Chinese ethnic spirit
– The contemporary characteristics of the Chinese ethnic spirit
D.5 Attitudes toward the environment
• State Council (1999): not mentioned.
• Ministry of Education (2001): specifies that equipping students with “basic consciousness of
the environment” is one of the objectives of the new curriculum.
• State Council (2004): one of the main goals of youths’ moral construction is to establish their
“consciousness of the environment,” as well as “the basic ability to handle the relationship
between men and nature.”
• Ministry of Education (2004): the document does not explicitly mention the environment
in its main objectives section. However, the framework adds sections on topics such as
“sustainable development path” into the new curriculum.
• Added sections in the new curriculum:
– “New demands of economic development”
– “Scientific outlook on development”
– “Sustainable and balanced economic development”
• Added items in the new Gaokao framework:
– Scientific outlook on development
– Sustainable and balanced economic development
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Appendix E Survey
E.1 Detailed description of survey sections
In this section we first provide a complete description of our survey including every question
asked.
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Complete Set of Survey Questions
Survey of Peking University Undergraduates
This document includes all questions asked in our Peking University survey. In 
Appendix F, below, we plot estimated effects of the new curriculum one question at a 
time for all survey questions, using responses to the main (online) wave of our survey. 
We regress each survey question outcome on the New Curriculum dummy variable in a 
model including province and cohort fixed effects (i.e., the baseline model in the main 
text of the paper). We then plot the estimated coefficient on the New Curriculum dummy 
for each survey question. In addition to showing the estimated effect of the new 
curriculum on each survey question outcome, we also show confidence intervals and p-
values using the FDR adjustment within survey question category (further detail is 
provided in Appendix F). To calculate the FDR adjusted p-values and to ease the 
presentation of the results, we re-organize the questions into conceptually-related 
categories (original ordering available from the authors upon request). For several 
questions listed at the end of the survey, there is no variation conditional on province 
and cohort, so we will not estimate effects of the curriculum on these questions.
A. Individual background characteristics, media consumption, and risk preferences
Our survey asked a range of questions about students’ backgrounds. Specifically, the survey 
included four sets of questions that we include in our balance table in the main text of the paper: (i) a 
set of questions regarding students’ own background characteristics; (ii) a set of questions about 
students’ parents; (iii) a set of questions about students’ educational backgrounds; and (iv) a 
question about students’ participation in the Communist Youth League. We do not expect these 
variables to have been affected by the curriculum change. The survey also asked students about: (v) 
whether their parents voted in local elections in the past; (vi) students’ media consumption; and, 
(vii) students’ risk preferences. We do not expect these variables to have been affected by the 
curriculum change, though students’ exposure to the new curriculum might have affected parents’ 
voting or students’ knowledge of parents’ voting behavior and it is possible that changed political 
attitudes would change students’ media choices.
(i) Background characteristics included in the balance table: personal
1.   Date of birth  (year/month/day)
2.   Height (cm)
3.   Ethnicity
a = Han b = Zhuang c = Man d = Hui
e = Miao f = Uyghur g = Others
4.   Gender
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a = Male b = Female
5.   Hukou/migration status before entering college
a = Urban b = rural
6.   Number of siblings
(ii) Background characteristics included in the balance table: parents
7.   Father’s educational attainment (only count the level that is completed)
a = No schooling b = Elementary school c = Junior high
d = High school e = Vocational college f = College and above
8.   Father’s Hukou/migration status
a = Urban b = rural
9.   Father’s occupation
a = Agricultural b = Non-agricultural
10.   Mother’s educational attainment (only count the level that is completed)
a = No schooling b = Elementary school c = Junior high
d = High school e = Vocational college f = College and above
11.   Mother’s Hukou/migration status
a = Urban b = rural
12.   Mother’s occupation
a = Agricultural b = Non-agricultural
13.   Either parent a member of CCP?
a = Yes b = No
(iii) Background characteristics included in the balance table: education
14.   Have you ever taken the gaokao?
15.   Besides Chinese, Math and English, what other subjects did you choose to be tested on 
        during gaokao? (multiple choice)
a = Physics b = Chemistry c = Biology
d = Politics e = History f = Geography
16.   Indicate your college major.
(iv) Background characteristics included in the balance table: politics prior to college
17.   Have you been you a member of the Communist Party youth organization?
a = Yes b = No
(v) Parents’ voting experience (as reported by students)
18.   My parents have voted for local (county or district) People’s Congress representatives before.
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(vi) Students’ media consumption
19.   Where do you obtain news and other important information?
        Please rank your top three information sources from the following:
a = Domestic TV b = Domestic radio c = Domestic internet sites
d = Domestic newspaper and magazines e = SMS
f = Friends g = Others
20.  How often do you obtain news and other important information from foreign websites?
a = More than once a day b = Once a day
c = Once a week d = Once a month
e = Less often than once a month
21.  Typically, how do you get access to foreign websites?
a = Do not go to foreign websites at all
b = Free access from the library
c = Peking University internet service bundle
d = Other private internet services (e.g. Netpass)
e = Other channel (please specify)
22.  What’s your typical purpose going on foreign websites? Please rank your top 3 purposes.
a = Reading news b = Entertainment 
c = Social network d = Searching for information/resources
e = Applying for foreign schools f = Academic reasons
g = Others (please specify)
23.  Do you own a computer on campus?
a = Yes b = No, use dorm mate’s computer
c = No, use library’s computer d = Others (please specify)
(vii) Students’ risk preferences
24.   Generally speaking (either in life or work), please tick a box on the scale, where the value 0 
         means: “unwilling to take risks” and the value 10 means: “fully prepared to take risk.”
25.   Regarding your future career life, please tick a box on the scale, where the value 0 means: 
         “unwilling to take risks” and the value 10 means: “fully prepared to take risk.”
26.   If you had 10,000RMB that you were saving in the bank, how much, if any, would you choose 
        to invest in the stock market?
a = 0% b = More than 0% but less than 25%
c = Between 25% and 50% d = Between 50% and 75%
e = Between 75% and 100% f = 100%
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B. “First stage”: changes in factual political knowledge
Our survey asked students factual questions about political institutions that were discussed in much 
greater depth under the new curriculum. Note: these questions appeared later in the actual survey, 
so students did not begin the survey attempting to respond to our questions with “factually correct” 
answers.
27.   I know that the village head is elected by ordinary people through vote (one-man one-vote).
a = Yes b = No
28.   I know that I can participate in the voting of local (county or district) People’s Congress 
         representatives.
a = Yes b = No
C. Primary attitudes of interest
Our survey asked students a number of questions about beliefs and attitudes that the curriculum 
reform was aimed at changing. These questions belong to 5 broad categories that we examine in the 
text, with each of these broad categories split into narrower sub-categories. The 5 broad categories are 
as follows:
I. Governance, split into (i) trust in government officials and (ii) views on the civic-mindedness 
of officials and on the necessity of unofficial payments.
II. Political Institutions, split into (i) perception of the degree to which Chinese political 
institutions are democratic; (ii) students’ views on the wisdom of the masses and unconstrained 
democracy; and, (iii) students’ views of the defining characteristics of democracy.
III. Economic Institutions, which includes a question on (i) attitudes toward unconstrained, free-
market economic institutions.
IV. Identity, split into (i) views on ethnic identity (i.e., on minorities and a unified Chinese ethnic 
heritage) and (ii) students’ sense of national (as opposed to international) identity.
V. Environment, which includes questions on (i) attitudes toward environmental regulation.
I. Governance
(i) Trust in government officials
On a 1-5 scale, with 1 meaning complete distrust, and 5 meaning complete trust, describe your level 
of trust in the following institutions:
29.   Central government
30.   Provincial government
31.   Local government
A.21
32.   Courts
33.   Armed forces
34.   Police
(ii) Views on the civic-mindedness of officials and on the necessity of unofficial payments
For the following questions, please choose:
a = Strongly disagree b = Disagree
c = Neutral d = Agree
e = Strongly agree
35.   Village heads put their own interest before those of people.
36.   Village heads care primarily about the powerful and rich people, and neglect the interests of 
         ordinary people.
In your opinion, how often is it necessary for people like you to have to make unofficial payments/
gifts in the following situations:
a = Never b = Seldom c = Sometimes 
d = Usually e = Always
37.   Interacting with the traffic police?
38.   Requesting official documents (such as passport or birth certificate)?
39.   Interacting with the civil courts?
40.   Interacting with the providers of primary or secondary education?
41.   Interacting with doctors?
For the following questions, please choose:
a = Yes b = No
42.   Do you think that paying a bribe is an acceptable way to accomplish something?
43.   Do you think that paying a bribe is an effective way to accomplish something?
44.   From the perspective of local government officials, do you think they would accept bribe when 
         it is offered to them?
II. Political Institutions
(i) Beliefs about the degree to which Chinese political institutions are democratic
45.   Where would you place our country under the present government?
Completely undemocratic     Completely democratic
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
46.   In reality, ordinary people are able to influence who becomes the village head.
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(ii) Views on the wisdom of the masses and unconstrained democracy
For the following questions, please choose:
a = Strongly disagree b = Disagree
c = Neutral d = Agree
e = Strongly agree
47.   Ordinary people can judge who would make a better village head.
48.   Theoretically speaking, ordinary people should be able to influence the decision of who 
         becomes the village head.
49.   Ordinary people know clearly which leader is doing a better job.
50.   For the following statements regarding democracy, choose one that you agree the most:
a = Democracy is preferable to any other form of political system.
b = Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government may be preferable to a 
                     democratic one.
c = For people like me, it does not matter whether a government is democratic or 
                    authoritarian.
d = Do not know.
51.   Here is a scale of 1 to 10 measuring the extent to which people think democracy is 
         suitable for our country.
Completely unsuitable      Perfectly suitable
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
(iii) Characteristics of “democracy”
52.   From your own perspective, which of the following do you think are characteristics of a 
         democracy? List them in order of importance to you. (1=most important, 5=least important)
a = Direct election of national government representatives
b = Freedom of speech and press 
c = The management of the country reflects the will of the ruling class
d = People’s participation in the political process
e = Competitive election
III. Economic Institutions
(i) Attitudes toward unconstrained, free-market economic institutions
53.    For the following statements regarding a market economy, choose one that you agree the most:
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a = A market economy is preferable to any other form of economic system.
b = Under some circumstances, a planned economy may be preferable to a market economy.
c = For people like me, it does not matter whether the economic system is organized as a 
                    market economy or as a planned economy.
d = Do not know.
IV. Identity
(i) Ethnic identity
54.   Generally speaking, would you say that people in minority groups can be trusted, or that 
        you cannot be too careful in dealing with them?
a = Completely trustworthy b = Relatively trustworthy
c = Neutral d = Relatively careful
e = Completely untrustworthy, need to be very careful
55.   China is a country made up of multiple ethnic groups. Which one of the following 
        statements regarding ethnic minority groups do you agree more?
a = Comparing to Han Chinese, ethnic minority groups are relatively independent groups.
b = Ethnic minority groups are the same as Han Chinese, and they are all Chinese people.
56.   China is a country made up of multiple ethnic groups. Which one of the following statements 
        regarding ethnic minority groups do you agree more?
a = Ethnic minority groups share the same historic heritage and cultural traditions as the 
       Han Chinese.
b = Ethnic minority groups have different historic heritage and cultural traditions with the 
                    Han Chinese.
57.   Can you imagine yourself marrying a member from a different ethnic group in the future?
a = Can imagine b = Cannot imagine
(ii) National identity
58.   Where would you place your identity on a spectrum, with being Chinese on one end and being 
         a world citizen on the other end? 
Chinese identity only Equal mixture World citizen only
      Chinese and world citizen
                  1 2 3 4 5
V. Environment
(i) Attitudes toward environmental regulation
59.   As we all know, the government’s fiscal resources are limited. Would you be willing to give 
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        part of your income or pay more taxes, if you were sure that the extra money was used to
        protect the environment?
a = Support b = Don’t support
60.   People often talk about what the goals of this country should be for the next ten years. Listed 
         below are some common goals for a nation. Please pick the one that you consider as primary 
         for a nation.
a = A high level of economic growth 
b = Maintaining economic stability
c = Maintaining order in the nation
d = Giving people more say in important government decisions
e = Protecting the environment
61.   Here are two statements people sometimes make when discussing the environment and 
         economic growth. Which of them comes closer to your own point of view?
a = Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic 
                      growth and some loss of jobs.
b = Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment 
                      suffers to some extent.
D. Behavior related to primary outcomes of interest
Our focus in the survey was to determine whether the change in educational content affected 
students’ political beliefs and attitudes. In addition to asking about attitudes, the survey asked 
students about several actions that they may have taken that are plausibly related to attitudes that 
the curriculum aimed to change. Specifically, the survey asked about: (i) political behavior (related to 
views on Chinese political institutions); (ii) investments in risky financial securities (related to 
views on markets); and, (iii) interactions with members of minority ethnic groups (related to 
attitudes toward and beliefs about ethnic minorities).
(i) Political behavioral outcomes
62.   I have voted for local (county or district) People’s Congress representatives before.
63.   I plan to vote for local (county or district) People’s Congress representatives.
64.   Are you a CCP member, or reserved member of the CCP?
a = Yes b = No
65.   Have you ever participated in political groups other than CCP and Communist Party Youth 
            Organization?
a = Yes b = No
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(ii) Investment in risky financial securities
Have you had the following investment experiences before?
66. Stocks?
67. Bonds?
(iii) Interactions with members of minority ethnic groups
68.   Have you worked with minority group students at school before (in study groups or class 
            projects)?
a = Yes b = No                                       
E. Additional political attitudes that are of interest
Our survey included questions asking students about political attitudes that are of interest to us, but 
that are not our focus in the body of the paper because they are not discussed in the government 
documents outlining the curriculum reform, are not associated with changes in the textbooks’ 
content, or because there is some ambiguity in the government’s desired attitudes. Specifically, the 
survey included questions regarding: (i) generalized trust and trust in non-governmental 
organizations (which we did not expect to have been affected by the curriculum change); (ii) 
efficiency/equity preferences; (iii) views on infrastructure investment; (iv) views on civil 
disobedience; (v) the “Three Represents” political ideology espoused by ex-President Jiang Zemin; 
(vi) students’ perceptions of current political institutions; and, (vii) nationalistic and militaristic 
attitudes.
(i) Generalized trust and trust in non-governmental organizations
69.   Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you cannot be 
        too careful in dealing with people?
a = Completely trustworthy b = Relatively trustworthy
c = Neutral d = Relatively careful
e = Completely untrustworthy, need to be very careful
On a 1-5 scale, with 1 meaning complete distrust, and 5 meaning complete trust, describe your level 
of trust in the following institutions:
70.   Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
71.   Banks and financial system
72.   Foreign investors
(ii) Equity/efficiency preferences
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73.   As we all know, the government’s fiscal resources are limited. Would you be willing to give 
        part of your income or pay more taxes, if you were sure that the extra money was used to
        improve social welfare (education, support for the poor, health care, etc.)?
74.   Which of the following statements do you agree with more?
a = Government should enact policies that make the distribution of income more equal, 
                    even if they reduce the rate of economic development.
b = Government should enact policies that increase the rate of economic development, even 
       if they make the distribution of income more unequal.
(iii) Views on infrastructure investment
75. As we all know, the government’s fiscal resources are limited. Would you be willing to give
      part of your income or pay more taxes, if you were sure that the extra money was used to
      improve infrastructure (roads, ports, railroads, etc.)?
a = Support b = Don’t support
(iv) Views on civil disobedience
For the following questions, please choose:
a = Strongly disagree b = Disagree
c = Neutral d = Agree
e = Strongly agree
76.   If government does not operate according to the law, people should have the rights to disobey 
         the government.
77.   I’m not fearful of officials and I don’t hesitate to object to any official who has done something 
         wrong, or report his misconduct to the authorities.
(v) The “Three Represents”
78.    Which of the following groups and their interests should influence government policy? 
          (Please rank the top three)
a = Farmer/peasants b = Township or village enterprise employees
c = Factory workers d = SOE employees
e = Private enterprise employees f = SOE managers
g = Private enterprise managers/owners
h = Teachers i = Intellectuals
j = Celebrities k = Civil servants
l = Government officials m = CCP members
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n = Bank owners (or managers in financial sector)
o = Employees at foreign firm
79.   What qualities should qualify a person for membership in the CCP?
a = Ideology b = Political mission
c = Income d = Social status
e = Family ties f = Others
(vi) Perceptions of current institutions
80.    Which of the following groups and their interests, to the best of your knowledge, are actually
          influencing government policy? (Please rank the top three) 
a = Farmer/peasants b = Township or village enterprise employees
c = Factory workers d = SOE employees
e = Private enterprise employees f = SOE managers
g = Private enterprise managers/owners
h = Teachers i = Intellectuals
j = Celebrities k = Civil servants
l = Government officials m = CCP members
n = Bank owners (or managers in financial sector)
o = Employees at foreign firm
81.   What qualities, to the best of your knowledge, actually do qualify a person for membership in 
         the CCP?
a = Ideology b = Political mission
c = Income d = Social status
e = Family ties f = Others
(vii) Nationalistic and militaristic attitudes
82.   Does Japan do more good or harm to the region?
a = Much more good than harm b = Somewhat more good than harm
c = Equal harm and good d = Somewhat more harm than good
e = Much more harm than good f = Don’t know
83.   Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would 
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         you be willing to fight for your country? 
a = Yes b = No
F. Additional behavioral outcomes that are of interest
Our survey asked students about behaviors that may be related to students’ views on Chinese 
political and economic institutions more broadly. Specifically, the survey asked about: (i) experience 
with less risky financial transactions (which we expect should not have been affected by the 
curriculum change); (ii) pro-social behavior; (iii) complaining to authority figures and participation 
in civil disobedience; and, (iv) participation in patriotic protests (which we expect should not have 
been affected by the curriculum change).
(i) Experience with less-risky financial transactions
Have you had the following investment experiences before?
84. Bank savings account
85. Credit card
86. Bank loan
87. None of {bank savings account, credit card, bank loan, stocks, bonds}
(ii) Pro-social behavior
88.   Have you donated money to charity before?
a = Yes b = No
89.   Have you ever participated in the activities of a non-profit (such as volunteer services)?
a = Yes b = No
(iii) Complaining to authority figures and participation in civil disobedience
90.   Have you ever complained to school authorities to protect your personal interest (e.g. 
         regarding tuition, dorm assignment)?
a = Yes b = No
91.   Have you ever reported government misconduct to either relevant agencies, or representatives, 
         or civil servants?
a = Yes b = No
92.   Have you ever participated in protests concerning social issues (such as pollution and 
            education)?
a = Yes b = No
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(iv) Participation in patriotic protests
93.   Have you ever participated in anti-Japanese protests?
a = Yes b = No
G. Behavior in incentivized games
Our survey included two incentivized preference elicitation games. We elicited students’ risk 
preferences as well as their preferences for redistribution.
94.   Certainty equivalent of a risky gamble in risk preference elicitation game (larger certainty
        equivalent implies less risk aversion).
95.   Average payment allocated toward “self” (rather than “other”) in game eliciting preferences for
        redistribution (larger value implies less equity-minded).
H. High school teachers’ methods of instruction
Our survey asked students about instructional methods in their high schools to study whether 
teaching practices changed along with the change in educational content. On the one hand, one aim 
of the curriculum reform was to increase student interaction with teachers; on the other hand, the 
very high stakes of the gaokao college entrance exam did not change.
96.   On a scale of 1 to 5, how much did your high school teacher encourage participation during
        lecture?
97.   On a scale of 1 to 5, how much did your high school teacher encourage you to study and
        explore the answers on your own, as opposed to telling you the answer up front?
98.   On a scale of 1 to 5, how much do you think memorizing material was important for doing
        well in high school?
99.  On a scale of 1 to 5, how much do you think class/lecture and teaching activities in high
         school were centered on gaokao preparation?
I. Textbook covers: checking policy implementation and student recollection
Our survey asked students to identify the Politics textbooks they used in high school, providing 
them with images of the covers of textbooks published under the old and new curricula. We check 
that our treatment assignment by provinceXcohort cell (based on official reports) matched actual 
exposure to textbooks. Responses to this question also provide evidence of students’ recollection of 
their high school Politics course. Note: we only showed pictures of the textbook covers; they were not 
labeled as belonging to either the old or new curriculum.
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100.   Please choose the covers of the textbooks that you used in your high school political science 
          courses.
a = High school new curriculum
b = High school old curriculum
c = Can’t remember
d = Others; please specify the publisher’s name if you remember
J. Students’ personalities
Our survey included 25 questions about students’ personalities measuring the “Big 5” personality 
traits.  The 5 traits are: (i) neuroticism; (ii) extraversion; (iii) openness; (iv) agreeableness; and, (v) 
conscientiousness. We do not expect these variables to have been affected by the curriculum change. 
Note that the questions are organized by personality trait below, rather than listed in the order in 
which they appeared in the survey (as noted above, the original survey ordering is available from the 
authors).
(i) Neuroticism
On each numerical scale that follows, indicate which point is generally more descriptive of you. 
If the two terms are equally descriptive, mark the midpoint.
101.      Calm Eager
1 2 3 4 5
102.      Confident Cautious
1 2 3 4 5
103.      Upbeat Discouraged
1 2 3 4 5
104.      Don’t Give a Darn Easily Embarrassed
1 2 3 4 5
105.      Unflappable Distractible
1 2 3 4 5
(ii) Extraversion
On each numerical scale that follows, indicate which point is generally more descriptive of you. 
If the two terms are equally descriptive, mark the midpoint.
106.      Prefer Being Alone Prefer Being with Other People
1 2 3 4 5
107.      Pessimistic Optimistic
1 2 3 4 5
108.      Private Exhibitionist
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1 2 3 4 5
109.      Cool Outgoing
1 2 3 4 5
110.      Thoughtful Conversational
1 2 3 4 5
(iii) Openness
On each numerical scale that follows, indicate which point is generally more descriptive of you. 
If the two terms are equally descriptive, mark the midpoint.
111.     No-nonsense A Dreamer
1 2 3 4 5
112.      Practical Theoretical
1 2 3 4 5
113.     Following Authority Following Imagination
1 2 3 4 5
114.      Seek Routine Seek Novelty
1 2 3 4 5
115.      Prefer Things Clear-cut Comfortable with Ambiguity
1 2 3 4 5
(iv) Agreeableness
On each numerical scale that follows, indicate which point is generally more descriptive of you. 
If the two terms are equally descriptive, mark the midpoint.
116.      Abrupt Courteous
1 2 3 4 5
117.      Selfish Generous
1 2 3 4 5
118.      Cold Warm
1 2 3 4 5
119.      Independent Team Player
1 2 3 4 5
120.      Skeptical Trusting
1 2 3 4 5
(v) Conscientiousness
On each numerical scale that follows, indicate which point is generally more descriptive of you. 
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If the two terms are equally descriptive, mark the midpoint.
121.      Messy Neat
1 2 3 4 5
122.      Open-ended Decisive
1 2 3 4 5
123.      Easily Distracted Stay Focused
1 2 3 4 5
124.      Comfortable with Chaos A Preference for Order
1 2 3 4 5
125.      Procrastinate On Time
1 2 3 4 5
K. Students’ values and beliefs about the determinants of success
Our survey asked students about: (i) their values; as well as (ii) whether they believed success was 
more determined by internal or external factors.
(i) Values
Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do 
you consider to be especially important?  (can choose up to three)
126. Chose “independent”?
127. Chose “hard work”?
128. Chose “feeling of responsibility”?
129. Chose “imagination”?
130. Chose “tolerance and respect for other people”?
131. Chose “thrift, saving money and things”?
132. Chose “determination, perseverance”?
133. Chose “religious faith”?
134. Chose “unselfishness”?
135. Chose “obedience”?
136. Chose “self-expression”?
137.   One’s wealth is the measure of one’s personal worth.
a = Strongly disagree b = Disagree
c = Neutral d = Agree
e = Strongly agree
138.   If you were making decisions for a company. Would you let your company carry on profitable 
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         activities that are not illegal, but not quite moral?
For the following question, please choose:
a = Strongly disagree b = Disagree
c = Neutral d = Agree
e = Strongly agree
139.   I can’t stand the powerful and influential bullying the powerless and the weak. I like to stand 
          up for the weak.
140.   I see myself as an autonomous individual.
a = Strongly disagree b = Disagree
c = Neutral d = Agree
e = Strongly agree
(ii) Internal versus external determinants of success
141.   What determines the success of a business? Pick two of the following:
a = Guanxi b = Business strategy
c = Corruption d = Quality of the product
e = Corporate management f = Luck
142.   In China today, hard work has fair returns.
a = Strongly disagree b = Disagree
c = Neutral d = Agree
e = Strongly agree
143.   In China today, ability and talent earn fair returns.
a = Strongly disagree b = Disagree
c = Neutral d = Agree
e = Strongly agree
144.   In China today, corruption is unavoidable if you want to be successful.
a = Strongly disagree b = Disagree
c = Neutral d = Agree
e = Strongly agree
L. Perceptions of returns to schooling, occupational preferences, and labor market 
experience
Our survey included (i) a set of questions eliciting students’ beliefs about the returns to schooling, 
which we do not expect to have been affected by the curriculum change; (ii) questions about students’ 
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occupational preferences (both sector and location); and, (iii) questions about students’ actual work 
experience as interns.
(i) Beliefs about the returns to schooling
145.   Suppose, hypothetically, you were to stop school after finishing junior high. Think about the 
            kinds of jobs you might be offered and that you might accept. How much do you think you 
            will earn in a typical week, month or year when you are about 30 to 40 years old?
146.   How about if you were to stop school after finishing senior high?
147.   How about if you were to stop school after finishing this school year?
148.   How about if you were to stop school after finishing college?
149.   Now, we would like you to think about adult men who are about 30 to 40 years old and who 
            have completed only elementary school. Think not just about the ones you know personally,   
            but all men like this throughout the country. How much do you think they earn in a typical 
            week, month or year?
150.   How about if he were to stop school after finishing junior high?
151.   How about if he were to stop school after finishing senior high?
152.   How about if he were to stop school after finishing college?
(ii) Preferences regarding occupational sector and location
153.   Rank the top three types of jobs from the following in terms of their appeal to you:
a = Working in the national civil service b = Working in the local civil service
c = Working in the military d = Working for a Chinese private firm
e = Working for a foreign firm in China f = Working for a state-owned enterprise
g = Working for institutional organizations (e.g. school, hospital, research institute, etc.)
h = Starting your own firm as an entrepreneur
g = Others
154.   Rank the following locations in terms of their appeal to you as places to live and work:
a = Hometown b = Beijing / Shanghai / Guangzhou
c = Hong Kong / Macau d = A foreign country
e = Others
(iii) Prior work experience
155.   Have you worked in an internship before?
a = Yes b = No
156.   If you have interned before, in which sector is your internship organization? 
           (Choose all that apply)
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a = Government agency b = Chinese private firm
c = Foreign firm in China d = SOE
e = Newly established firm f = Others
g = Never interned before
M. Additional survey questions excluded from the analysis in the dot plots
Our survey included a final group of questions which are not easily analyzed as outcomes in our 
baseline model. The dorm names and addresses are unstandardized text; students’ provinces and 
dates of educational transitions exhibit practically no variation conditional on cohort and province 
fixed effects. We thus do not present estimated effects of the curriculum change on these variables in 
Appendix F, but list them here for completeness.
157.   Dorm address and room number.
158.   Birthplace (province/city).
159.   Province where you completed 10th grade.
160.   In which province did you take the gaokao?
161.   Date of entry into high school (year/month).
162.   Date of high school graduation (year/month).
A.36
E.2 Recruitment email for Peking University online survey (2013)
In English:
Dear Students,
Greetings! This is a research study about young people in China, consisting of on-
line survey questions and some simple online economic games. It is distributed to
all undergraduate students at Peking University. This survey is organized by Univer-
sity of California at Berkeley, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and
Guanghua School of Management at Peking University. We welcome your participa-
tion.
Our survey aims to understand Chinese young people’s opinions on political in-
stitutions, social issues, economic activities, and so on. The information we collect
will only be used for academic research. There is no right or wrong answer to these
questions. Your honesty and patience in answering these questions will be extremely
helpful to our academic study, which will foster the creation of human knowledge.
The entire study (online survey & online economic games) will take about 30 min-
utes to complete. Each student can only complete one survey. With your student ID,
you will be rewarded with at least RMB 40 for your participation. Depending on your
responses, you can also earn up to RMB 110 in the economic games. Furthermore, you
will be entered into a drawing that gives out 1 iPad with Retina Display, 5 iPad Minis,
and 10 iPod Shuffles.
Please note that you have to be at least 18 years old to be able to participate in this
survey.
If you are interested in participating in this study, please click on the link below:
<link>
Peking University, Guanghua School of Management
May 6th, 2013
In Chinese:
亲爱的同学：
见解独到的你，是否对中国的政治和社会有自己的见解？天资聪颖的你，是否想体
验一下“高智商”的经济学游戏？现在，我们提供了一个机会让如此优秀的你发表独到
见解、并且赢取高端大气上档次的iPad 4和iPad Mini幸运大奖！
这是一份针对中国年轻人“社会观念和风险态度”的问卷调查和在线经济学小游戏，
由美国加州大学伯克利分校（UC Berkeley）、斯坦福大学（Stanford）、香港科技大
学（HKUST)和北京大学光华管理学院（PKU GSM）联合组织。本次调查针对北京大
学本科生（年满18周岁）。我们的研究主要为了了解中国年轻人的社会观念、价值偏
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好和风险规避行为等，我们搜集到的所有信息将只用于学术研究。你的回答将直接有
利于学术研究，推动人类知识的开拓。每一个北大学生的参与都对研究的结果至关重
要！
整个在线调查只需花费你30分钟时间，但报酬非常丰厚！完成整个问卷你即可
凭借学号获得至少40元，至多110元的现金奖励！参加此次研究，你更有机会抽奖获
得1台iPad with Retina Display, 5台iPad Mini和10台iPod Shuffle！
开始行动起来吧！马上点击以下链接：<link>
北京大学光华管理学院
2013年5月6日
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E.3 Screenshot of online survey
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E.4 Photo of student respondent (raffle winner)
A.40
E.5 Follow-up survey
As an additional check that the treatment effects we estimate from the online survey do not sig-
nificantly differ from what we would find among non-respondents at Peking University, we con-
ducted a small, paper and pencil follow-up survey using in-person recruitment, in June and July,
2014. The follow-up survey was conducted by a team of 18 Peking University undergraduates,
who recruited survey participants from a broad (albeit non-random) sample of the Peking Uni-
versity dorms, and handed out a paper version of the same survey questionnaire as was used
online (to be completed individually, and privately). In order to recruit students across majors
and genders, the survey team included a mix of men and women; teams recruited in dorms across
the Peking University campus, including on the medical campus.
Potential participants in the follow-up survey were reminded of the online survey, and were
asked not to complete the in-person survey if they had already completed the online survey. The
survey team emphasized that the survey data would only be used for academic research and that
respondents’ privacy would be protected. Overall, 446 students who had not completed the online
survey were asked to complete the paper survey; the response rate in the follow-up survey was
78%, for a total of 347 respondents. Respondents were paid 30 RMB (around $5) for participating
in the follow-up survey, and required around 30 minutes to complete the survey. A data entry
firm digitized the responses, and two research assistants manually checked a random subset of
the responses for accuracy.
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Appendix F Estimated effects on all survey outcomes
We estimate our baseline difference in differences model using every survey question as an out-
come (other than those regressions that cannot be estimated in a model with province and cohort
fixed effects). We present the estimates for the survey questions in the same order as that in which
they are provided in the complete survey in Appendix E.1; the questions excluded from this anal-
ysis are noted at the end of the survey. We summarize the results in a dot plot that shows the
coefficient estimate on the NewCurriculum dummy variable from estimating equation 1, as well
as the 95% confidence interval, for each outcome variable indicated.
For ease of presentation, we standardize each outcome variable and we plot the absolute value
of the coefficient; coefficients with positive signs are denoted with closed symbols, while coeffi-
cients with negative signs are denoted with open symbols (we also indicate the sign of the estimate
in brackets). The figure also includes p-values (adjusted using the false discovery rate procedure
across questions within a category marked by light dashed lines) from a test that the coefficient on
NewCurriculum equals zero.
Our results support the evidence provided in the main text of the paper. Moving down the
dot plot, one can see that students’ background variables are not significantly affected by the new
curriculum, nor is their media consumption or their risk preferences. Factual knowledge, attitudes
regarding governance, political institutions, and economic institutions generally are significantly
affected, with much larger point estimates than for the background variables. Attitudes regarding
the environment move in the opposite direction of what the government intended; and, behavioral
outcomes are mixed, as discussed in the main text.
Following the behavioral outcomes, we show the questions asked about trust in non-government
organizations and individuals—one can see there is no systematic effect here, and the effect on the
z-score is almost exactly 0. Attitudes about which we did not have a strong prediction gener-
ally were not significantly affected, though one sees a shift toward favoring growth over equity
among students exposed to the new curriculum. Behaviors about which we did not have a strong
prediction also do not show significant effects of the new curriculum.
Next, we present responses to survey questions about instructional practices. One can see
that while two of the questions appear to be statistically significant, they actually move in opposite
directions. Overall the z-score index captures the mixed results on the impact of the reform on
instruction: there is no significant effect.6
We then present results for a series of questions regarding students’ personalities. One can
see that, individually, these estimates are never statistically significant. For two of the “Big Five”
personality traits (openness and conscientiousness), we do find statistically significant z-score es-
timates. These differences may be the result of noise, may reflect an effect of the new curriculum,
or may result from a lack of balance along this dimension. To determine whether this potential
imbalance may affect our results, we estimated our baseline model for our six broad outcome
categories, controlling for an individual’s 5 personality z-scores, and our results are unchanged
(indeed, they are somewhat stronger—see Appendix G, Table G.7).
Next we examine students’ values: two of sixteen outcomes show effects significant at the 10%
level; we find no effects on students’ views on the determinants of success. We also find no ef-
6Note also that the FDR-adjusted p-values are quite low in this section; this captures the fact that we always run
two-sided statistical tests, and the FDR adjustment does not take into account the fact that one result is statistically
significantly different from 0, but falls far short of rejecting the null that the reform had no effects on instructional
methods in the desired direction.
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fects on students’ estimates of the returns to education, on students’ job preferences, or on their
self-reported internship experience. Finally, we show the estimated effect of our NewCurriculum
dummy variable on students’ identifying the new curriculum textbook as their own. This is on a
different scale because the estimated effect is extremely large—students we assign to new curricu-
lum status overwhelmingly recall the new curriculum textbooks as their own.
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Age [-] (1.000)
Height [+] (1.000)
Han [+] (1.000)
Female [-] (1.000)
Urban hukou [+] (1.000)
Total number of siblings [-] (1.000)
z-score [-] (0.343)
Father high school or above [+] (1.000)
Father urban hukou [-] (1.000)
Father non-agricultural occupation [-] (1.000)
Mother high school or above [+] (1.000)
Mother urban hukou [+] (1.000)
Mother non-agricultural occupation [+] (1.000)
Parents CCP members [-] (1.000)
z-score [+] (0.630)
Taken gaokao [-] (1.000)
High school humanities track [-] (1.000)
Social science college majors [-] (1.000)
z-score [-] (0.375)
Member of CCP youth league [+] (0.560)
Parents voted for PCR [+] (0.932)
Non-mainstream news sources [+] (1.000)
Frequency of news from foreign sites [+] (1.000)
Private access to foreign sites [+] (1.000)
Visit foreign sites for information [+] (1.000)
Own laptop [+] (1.000)
z-score [+] (0.197)
General risk preference [-] (0.220)
Career risk preference [-] (0.288)
Investment risk preference [-] (0.503)
z-score [-] (0.215)
Know of village head election [+] (0.047)
Know of PCR election [+] (0.101)
z-score [+] (0.010)
Trust: central government [+] (0.031)
Trust: provincial government [+] (0.060)
Trust: local government [+] (0.007)
Trust: courts [+] (0.084)
Trust: armed forces [+] (0.024)
Trust: police [+] (0.060)
z-score [+] (0.006)
Village head is not self-interested [+] (0.222)
VH cares not only about rich [+] (0.064)
Bribes are not necessary: police [+] (0.222)
Bribes are not necessary: document [+] (0.220)
Bribes are not necessary: courts [+] (0.222)
Bribes are not necessary: education [+] (0.222)
Bribes are not necessary: doctors [-] (0.410)
Bribes are not acceptable [+] (0.314)
Bribes are not effective [+] (0.222)
Officials would not accept bribes [-] (0.410)
z-score [+] (0.015)
How democratic is China [+] (0.025)
People can influence elections [+] (0.025)
z-score [+] (0.004)
People cannot judge VH [+] (0.016)
People should not influence election [+] (0.462)
People do not know better leaders [+] (0.462)
Democracy is not always preferable [+] (0.132)
China is not suitable for democracy [+] (0.204)
z-score [+] (0.055)
Participation is key for democracy [+] (0.155)
Skeptical of markets [+] (0.034)
Trust towards minorities [-] (0.134)
Han and minorities are similar [+] (0.134)
Han and minorities share heritage [-] (0.277)
Willing to marry minority [+] (0.134)
z-score [+] (0.401)
Identity: Chinese [+] (0.510)
Support environment spending [-] (0.480)
Environment as policy priority [-] (0.480)
Environment vs. growth [-] (0.480)
z-score [-] (0.104)
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Voted for PCR in the past [-] (0.852)
Plan to vote PCR [+] (1.000)
Member of CCP [+] (0.852)
Participate in political groups [+] (0.852)
z-score [+] (0.376)
Not invested in stocks [+] (0.069)
Not invested in bonds [+] (0.069)
z-score [+] (0.006)
Cooperated with minority [+] (0.957)
Trust: general [-] (0.163)
Trust: NGOs [+] (0.589)
Trust: financial institutions [+] (0.429)
Trust: foreign investors [+] (0.163)
z-score [-] (0.992)
Don't support social welfare [+] (0.027)
Prefer growth over equity [+] (0.027)
z-score [+] (0.003)
Support infrastructure spending [-] (0.329)
No right to disobey govt [+] (1.000)
Afraid of pointing out wrongs [+] (1.000)
z-score [+] (0.608)
Outsiders should influence policy [+] (0.755)
CCP should use modern criteria [+] (0.755)
z-score [+] (0.105)
Outsiders actually influence policy [+] (1.000)
CCP actually use modern criteria [-] (1.000)
z-score [+] (0.996)
Japan is harmful [+] (1.000)
Willingness to fight for China [-] (1.000)
z-score [+] (0.991)
Investment: saving [+] (0.770)
Investment: credit card [+] (0.553)
Investment: bank loan [-] (0.553)
Investment: none [-] (0.780)
z-score [+] (0.675)
Donate money to charity [-] (0.755)
Volunteer experiences [-] (0.755)
z-score [-] (0.158)
Not complained to school authority [+] (1.000)
Not reported government misconduct [+] (1.000)
Not engaged in social protests [+] (1.000)
z-score [+] (0.208)
Protested against Japan [-] (0.700)
Certainty equivalent [+] (1.000)
Average amount kept to self [-] (1.000)
z-score [-] (0.399)
Teacher encouraged participation [+] (0.183)
Teacher encouraged exploration [+] (0.067)
Memorization is not important [-] (0.067)
Less focused on gaokao prep. [+] (0.089)
z-score [+] (0.636)
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Eager vs. calm [+] (1.000)
Cautious vs. confident [-] (1.000)
Discouraged vs. upbeat [+] (1.000)
Embarrassed vs. don't care [+] (1.000)
Distractible vs. unflappable [+] (1.000)
z-score [+] (0.328)
With others vs. alone [-] (0.445)
Optimistic vs. pessimistic [-] (0.445)
Exhibitionist vs. private [-] (0.445)
Outgoing vs. cool [-] (0.500)
Conversational vs. thoughtful [-] (0.445)
z-score [-] (0.048)
Dreamer vs. no nonsense [-] (0.634)
Theoretical vs. practical [+] (0.634)
Imagination vs. authority [-] (0.634)
Novelty vs. routine [-] (0.634)
Ambiguity vs. clear-cut [+] (0.634)
z-score [-] (0.917)
Courteous vs. abrupt [-] (0.566)
Generous vs. selfish [-] (0.130)
Warm vs. cold [-] (0.180)
Team player vs. independent [-] (0.566)
Trusting vs. skeptical [-] (0.139)
z-score [-] (0.105)
Neat vs. messy [-] (0.202)
Decisive vs. open-ended [-] (0.851)
Focused vs. Distracted [-] (0.202)
Order vs. chaos [-] (0.395)
On time vs. procrastinate [-] (0.438)
z-score [-] (0.043)
Values: independence [+] (0.370)
Values: hard work [-] (0.056)
Values: responsibility [+] (0.692)
Values: imagination [-] (0.890)
Values: tolerance [-] (0.971)
Values: thrift [-] (0.424)
Values: perseverance [-] (0.692)
Values: faith [-] (0.566)
Values: unselfishness [+] (0.056)
Values: obedience [+] (0.890)
Values: self-expression [+] (0.890)
Personal worth beyond wealth [+] (0.243)
Moral decisions for business [-] (0.890)
Stand up for the weak [-] (0.971)
Identity: non-autonomous person [+] (1.000)
z-score [-] (0.692)
Business success [-] (0.765)
Return to hard work [+] (0.765)
Return to ability and talent [+] (0.765)
Corruption is avoidable [+] (0.765)
z-score [+] (0.334)
Own earnings: junior high [+] (0.904)
Own earnings: senior high [+] (0.904)
Own earnings: this year [+] (0.904)
Own earnings: college [-] (0.904)
Other's earnings: elementary [-] (0.904)
Other's earnings: junior high [+] (0.978)
Other's earnings: senior high [-] (0.904)
Other's earnings: college [-] (0.904)
z-score [+] (0.554)
Prefer public sector jobs [+] (1.000)
Prefer domestic locations [-] (1.000)
z-score [+] (0.644)
Internship experience [+] (1.000)
Interned in public sector [-] (1.000)
z-score [-] (0.935)
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Investment risk preference
Studied new curriculum textbooks [+] (0.000)
0 .5 1 1.5 2
Regression coefficient
on newcurr (standardized)
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Figure F.2: Dot plot showing effect of the new curriculum on all questions in our survey. Figure shows esti-
mated coefficients on the NewCurriculum dummy variable from a regression of the (standardized) outcome listed on
NewCurriculum and province and cohort fixed effects. Coefficients are presented as absolute values; coefficients with
positive signs are denoted with closed symbols, while coefficients with negative signs are denoted with open symbols
(the sign of the coefficient is indicated in brackets as well). Figure also shows 95% confidence intervals calculated using
standard errors clustered at the province×cohort level (censored below at 0) and p-values calculated using the false
discovery rate procedure (in parentheses).
A.47
Appendix G Additional results
G.1 Response rates by province×cohort cell
In the main text we noted that there is not a significantly different response rate to our survey by
curriculum studied, conditional on province and cohort fixed effects. In Table G.3, we present for
each province×cohort cell the number of students in our survey, as well as the number of students
enrolled at Peking University from each cell (the number of students by cell was provided by the
admissions office of Peking University). To estimate whether the new curriculum was associated
with a significantly different response rate from the old curriculum, we run a regression in which
the unit of observation is the province×cohort cell, the outcome variable is the response rate,
the explanatory variable is the NewCurriculum dummy variable analyzed in our main text, and
province and cohort fixed effects are included as controls.
In the note to Table G.3, we report the coefficient on the NewCurriculum dummy variable in
this regression, as well as the p-value from a test that the coefficient equals zero. We find that the
point estimate is small (response rates differ by less than 2 percentage points), and statistically
indistinguishable from 0 (the p-value is 0.519).
G.2 Do students try to provide “correct” (or politically correct) answers?
This can be best examined in the case of the variables relating to trust in government officials, as
they are measured on a 1–5 scale, allowing one to see shifts across the distribution of attitudes
(we present the distributions of responses to these questions by curriculum in Table G.4). A first
indication that respondents are likely not attempting to provide “correct” responses is the broad
range of answers to all of the questions we asked. In each curriculum, for all outcomes, we found
responses in the full range, from 1 to 5, and in every case the modal response was provided by
less than 60% of students. Another indication that in the new curriculum there was not a clearly
“correct” answer to our questions about trust is that modal responses were not located at an end
of the distribution. Nor was there always the same modal response: we see either modes of 3 or 4
for our various outcomes.
The changes in the distribution of responses across curricula are also consistent with students’
opinions changing, rather than simply moving to a new “correct” response. One can see that for
many outcomes, not only are there are shifts in the distribution toward the new curriculum modal
response (from below), but there are also movements away from the modal response (moving up).
For example, we asked students about their trust in local government on a 1–5 scale. Under the old
curriculum, the modal response was 3, with nearly 48% of students indicating this level of trust.
Under the new curriculum, the mode remained 3 (indicating no change in a “correct” answer),
with 45.25% of students choosing this response. Interestingly, responses of 1, 2, and the modal
response of 3 are all less common under the new curriculum, while the number of responses of
“4” increased by nearly 12 percentage points (over 50%).
G.3 Heterogeneous effects depending on students’ risk aversion
One might be concerned that students who are more risk averse (and so likely to be more con-
cerned about responding in a socially or politically acceptable way) exhibit different effects of
the new curriculum from students who are less risk averse. To determine whether this is the
case, we estimate our baseline regression model (equation 1) including an interaction between the
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NewCurriculum dummy variable and an indicator that a student is “risk seeking” (at or above the
median in the self-reported risk preferences question), along with the main effects. We find that
the more risk averse respondents in the study do not show significantly different effects of the new
curriculum: for half of the 12 outcomes we examine in our six categories of interest the interaction
term is positive, and in six it is negative; it is never statistically significant (see Table G.5).
G.4 Principal component analysis
As another check of the robustness of our results, we present estimates of the effects of the new cur-
riculum on our various indices, but rather than using a weighted sum of standardized outcomes
within a category, we examine the first principal component of the outcomes within a category.
In Table G.6, we show our baseline regressions for the outcomes for which we previously used
z-score indices (compare to Table 4, Panel A, in the main text). One can see that our results are
very similar constructing our indices in this alternative manner.
G.5 Alternative approach to inference using permutation tests
Because we have a relatively small number of treated units in our sample, we next make our
statistical inferences in an alternative manner, by comparing the treatment effect we estimate for
each index outcome to the distribution of placebo treatment effects we estimate when randomly
assigning new curriculum introduction dates to provinces. To be precise, we randomly assign
new curriculum introduction dates to provinces, with the dates drawn from the actual set of intro-
duction dates of the new curriculum, without replacement (so in a given year, the same number
of provinces have the placebo new curriculum introduced as had the actual new curriculum in-
troduced, but the placebo assignment will be to a random selection of provinces). We randomly
draw 10,000 sets of placebo treatment assignments, and estimate equation 1, for each of the six
main index variable categories (12 total outcomes).
We plot the distribution of t-statistics from the 10,000 estimated placebo treatment effects for
each outcome, in Figure G.3, and mark in the figure the location of the t-statistic of the actual
treatment effect within the placebo treatment effect distribution. We also report the share of the
placebo t-statistics that is larger than the actual statistic, in absolute value. One can view this
measure as analogous to a p-value in this placebo exercise. Across the outcomes considered, one
can see that the inferences drawn are very similar to the standard regressions.
G.6 The effects of student personalities
In Section Appendix F we noted that there was some evidence of differences in students’ Big 5
personality traits across curricula, conditional on province and cohort fixed effects. This might
lead one to wonder whether differences in students’ personalities might play some role in the
differences in political attitudes that we attributed to the new curriculum. We thus estimate our
baseline model (equation 1), but control for students’ z-score indices for all five Big 5 personality
traits. One can see in Table G.7 that including these controls does not affect our findings.
G.7 An omnibus test for selection
Our analysis in the text shows that (i) student characteristics are balanced across curricula (see
Table 2); and, (ii) controlling for all of the student and household characteristics in our balance
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table (other than student high school track, due to missing values) does not greatly affect our re-
sults (see Table 4, Panel B). We next conduct a more general test of the importance of selection
on observables driving our results by estimating our outcome variables (the 12 index variables
for the six categories of interest) using the full set of variables shown in the balance tables (again,
excluding high school track), and testing whether predicted outcomes significantly change across
curricula, controlling for province and cohort fixed effects. In Table G.8, we present the estimated
coefficient on the NewCurriculum dummy from estimating equation 1 with predicted index vari-
ables as the outcomes. In every case, the estimated effect of the new curriculum on the predicted
outcomes based on observables is close to 0 and statistically insignificant.
G.8 The effects of provincial political transitions on student attitudes
An important question about our analysis is whether the introduction of the new curriculum co-
incided with other provincial variation which might affect attitudes at the province×cohort level.
One possibility is that students who experienced important political transitions while in high
school may have differing views on governance, political institutions, etc. To examine this pos-
sibility, we collected information on all of the transitions of provincial governors and provincial
party secretaries (from baike.baidu.com and www.wikipedia.org) that occurred while students
in our sample were in high school. We then estimate our baseline specification, but controlling for
either the experience of a provincial governor turnover or a provincial party secretary turnover
while a student was in high school. In Table G.9, one can see that including these controls does
not affect our results.
G.9 Non-random introduction of the new curriculum across provinces
As described in the main text, the introduction of the new curriculum across provinces was non-
random, with richer, coastal provinces generally introducing the curriculum prior to the poorer
inland provinces. As discussed in Section 4.2, our identification strategy addresses a variety of
concerns about endogenous introduction of the new curriculum. We now more formally examine
the determinants of the introduction date of the new curriculum.
In Table G.10, we use two approaches to study the determinants of the introduction date of the
new curriculum. First, we treat China’s provinces as a cross-section, and allow province charac-
teristics in 2003 (just prior to the first wave of introduction) to determine the timing of adoption;
second, we consider a panel (observations at the province×year level), with province characteris-
tics in a given year determining new curriculum adoption in the following year. For each dataset
we estimate OLS models and Cox proportional hazard models. One can see in Table G.10, that our
most robust finding is that greater 2003 province income is quite predictive of earlier introduction
of the new curriculum (as are other variables correlated with income, such as fiscal revenues and
employment). Educational variables are generally less predictive, except for the percentage of
primary school students enrolling in secondary school, which again is correlated with income.
To determine whether higher 2003 incomes were associated with systematic differences in at-
titudes across cohorts, in Table 4, Panel D, we presented estimated effects of the new curriculum,
but controlling for a province’s 2003 gross regional product per capita interacted with the four
cohort fixed effects. One can see that including these controls does not affect our findings.
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G.10 Estimation using a “short panel”
We next address concerns about the effects of our sample’s composition on the estimated treatment
effects. Some provinces do not have any variation in curriculum studied among the four cohorts in
our sample, but these provinces are included in our baseline estimates (though they were excluded
from our comparison of means in Figure 3). One might wish to estimate the effects of the new
curriculum on a balanced panel that includes only provinces in which we observe variation in
curriculum. We thus estimate the effects of the new curriculum using a “short panel” that includes
only students from the last cohort under the old curriculum and the (adjacent) first cohort of the
new curriculum, from the 13 provinces for which we observe students from both of these cohorts
in our sample. We present the results in Table G.11: one can see that using this alternative dataset,
our results are very similar to those estimated using the entire set of province×cohort cells.
G.11 Attitudes and behavior
In section 5.3, we relate our finding of increased trust in government officials to behavioral out-
comes, generalizing from the relationship between reported attitudes and reported behavior ob-
served in the Asian Barometer Survey. This survey asks respondents about their trust in local
government officials, as we do; the only difference between our survey question and the Asian
Barometer question is that Asian Barometer respondents indicate their level of trust on a 1–4
scale, rather than a 1–5 scale (for ease of interpretation, we standardized responses to the trust
question). To ensure comparability with our survey sample, we limit our analysis to Chinese
respondents with at least 12 years of schooling.
The Asian Barometer Survey asks the following two questions about political action:
Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me
whether you, personally, have never, once, or more than once done any of these things during
the past three years:
1. Attended a demonstration or protest march.
2. Refused to pay taxes or fees to the government.
We construct dummy variables indicating engagement in the two political actions, and regress
these on (standardized) reported levels of trust in government officials. In robustness specifica-
tions, we control for respondents’ age, age squared, and gender. For both behavioral outcomes,
we find that greater trust in local government officials is associated with significantly less frequent
engagement in disruptive political action (results are presented in Table G.12). In section 5.3, we
then place these findings in relation to the changes in trust induced by the new curriculum: under
the assumption that the relationship between an individual’s trust in government officials and
their political behavior is similar for students in our survey to that for the broader set of educated
individuals in the Asian Barometer sample, the new curriculum would make students around
15–20% less likely to engage in these disruptive political activities relative to their mean.
G.12 Heterogeneous treatment effects
It is of interest to examine heterogeneity in the effects of the new curriculum for at least two rea-
sons: first, one might wish to wonder whether particular types of students were more susceptible
to persuasive content included in high school textbooks. Second, examining heterogeneity in the
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effect of the curriculum in our sample can be suggestive of whether the treatment effects we es-
timate are likely to be very different from those estimated on other groups of students. (Note
that our finding of generally similar results between our follow-up survey sample and our main
survey suggests that our survey findings have some generalizability to the broader population of
Peking University students.)
We consider three dimensions of heterogeneity that ex ante we believed might be important
determinants of students’ susceptibility to persuasion. First, we compare the effects of the new
curriculum on students whose parents were Chinese Communist Party members to those whose
parents were not. One might believe that children of CCP members would be more receptive to
government messages in textbooks than other students. Second, we compare the effects of the
new curriculum on students who report rarely acquiring information from foreign websites to the
effects on other students. One might expect students who only read Chinese news to be more
likely to have the lessons of the textbooks “stick”—exposure to foreign media might undo any
treatment effect of exposure to the new curriculum. Third, we use students’ predicted levels of
trust in government (we predict the government trust index variable using students’ background
characteristics) and test whether students with above-median levels of predicted trust reveal dif-
ferent treatment effects from students with below-median levels. One might expect that character-
istics associated with higher levels of trust in government officials would also be associated with
receptivity to the persuasive content of the new curriculum.
We estimate our baseline model (equation 1), but including the interaction between the NewCurriculum
dummy variable and the dimensions of heterogeneity we examine (plus lower order terms). In
Table G.13, Panel A, we examine the effects of the new curriculum by parents’ CCP membership.
While parents’ CCP status is significantly predictive of some political attitudes, it is not predictive
of differential effects of the new curriculum. In Panels B and C we conduct analogous exercises,
but examining heterogeneity by students’ media consumption and their predicted trust. Again,
these student characteristics are often predictive of students’ political attitudes, but they are not
associated with heterogeneity in the effects of the new curriculum.
G.13 Estimating weighted regressions
One might wonder whether, due to variation in response rates, our estimates differ from what
one would find from a sample that matched the composition of Peking University. As a check
of the external validity of our estimates to the broader Peking University population, we next
estimate our baseline model (equation 1), but we re-weight each observation by the inverse of
the survey response rate for the respondent’s province×cohort cell. Thus, if a particular cell was
under-represented in our survey sample due to low response rates, we now give observations in
that cell additional weight in our regressions to match the composition of Peking University. We
present our findings in Table G.14 and one can see that the results very closely match estimates
from the unweighted regressions.
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Figure G.3: Distribution of t-statistics resulting from 10,000 random assignments of provinces to
treatment status, as well as t-statistics from actual treatment status.
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Table G.3: Survey response rates
High School Entry Year
Province XX2006X XX2007X XX2008X XX2009X XXTotalX
Anhui 13/78 16/76 21/69 20/63 70/286
Beijing 44/393 51/406 54/405 41/403 190/1607
Chongqing 7/95 13/104 12/88 20/80 52/367
Fujian 12/79 13/75 21/72 17/83 63/309
Gansu 8/31 7/31 9/29 6/28 30/119
Guangdong 13/97 17/116 26/95 24/90 80/398
Guangxi 6/33 6/30 8/30 11/30 31/123
Guizhou 9/35 8/37 3/36 9/36 29/144
Hainan 1/25 4/28 6/25 5/24 16/102
Hebei 17/78 18/74 16/79 30/65 81/296
Heilongjiang 15/114 15/98 14/91 16/91 60/394
Henan 33/135 19/147 41/143 40/129 133/554
Hubei 27/108 20/118 28/128 23/119 98/473
Hunan 14/108 12/94 25/102 21/114 72/418
Inner Mongolia 7/32 4/36 4/35 14/32 29/135
Jiangsu 13/140 24/146 44/159 23/185 104/630
Jiangxi 21/70 8/66 22/74 20/75 71/285
Jilin 14/75 12/82 16/85 12/80 54/322
Liaoning 13/107 19/110 22/99 26/116 80/432
Ningxia 4/23 5/26 9/26 11/26 29/101
Qinghai 5/18 2/19 3/15 2/16 12/68
Shaanxi 21/96 15/82 23/116 19/104 78/398
Shandong 30/131 18/125 26/114 42/115 116/485
Shanxi 16/79 19/70 22/70 12/76 69/295
Sichuan 7/129 13/88 21/95 25/99 66/411
Tianjin 11/93 14/86 22/98 24/94 71/371
Tibet 0/9 0/5 0/13 0/12 0/39
Xinjiang 8/53 11/59 15/52 11/70 45/234
Yunnan 6/37 3/35 6/36 7/32 22/140
Zhejiang 23/141 21/138 37/150 22/171 103/600
XX XX XX XX XX XX
Total 418/2794 407/2761 576/2781 553/2846 1954/11182
Table shows the number of student responses in our survey, as well as the num-
ber of students enrolled at Peking University, for each province×cohort cell (data
provided by the admissions office of Peking University). Shaded cells represent
students who studied the new curriculum. To estimate whether the new curricu-
lum was associated with a significantly different response rate from the old cur-
riculum, we construct a dataset at the province×cohort level and regress a cell’s
response rate on the NewCurriculum dummy variable, as well as province and co-
hort fixed effects. The estimated coefficient on NewCurriculum is 0.019 (s.e. 0.029;
p-value = 0.519).
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Table G.6: First principal components
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
New Curriculum 0.440 0.269 0.234 0.193 0.084 -0.173 0.008 0.227
[0.173] [0.128] [0.081] [0.119] [0.088] [0.113] [0.123] [0.081]
Observations 1,765 1,733 1,724 1,603 1,803 1,708 1,698 1,698
Mean DV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Std.Dev. DV 1.910 1.777 1.097 1.357 1.202 1.141 1.178 1.094
All regressions include a full set of province and cohort fixed effects (not reported). Robust standard
errors in brackets, clustered at the province×cohort level.
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A.62
Table G.12: Outcomes from the Asian Barometer Survey
Dependent variable: Attended a demonstration Refused to pay taxes
or protest march or fees to the government
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust in local government -0.017 -0.019 -0.012 -0.013
[0.006] [0.006] [0.004] [0.005]
Observations 885 856 896 867
Individual controls No Yes No Yes
Mean DV 0.029 0.029 0.014 0.014
Std.Dev. DV 0.166 0.166 0.116 0.116
Regression results based on Asian Barometer Survey Wave 2 (2008) China module.
Samples restricted to individuals who completed at least high school education. In-
dividual controls are gender, age, and age2. Trust in local government is standardized.
A.63
T
ab
le
G
.1
3:
H
et
er
o
g
en
eo
u
s
ef
fe
ct
s
o
f
th
e
n
ew
cu
rr
ic
u
lu
m
D
ep
en
d
en
t
v
ar
ia
b
le
:
A:Trustin
govt.officials
B:Bribery
andcivic-
mindedness
C:Perception
ofChinese
democracy
D:Wisdomof
themasses
E:Characteristics
ofdemocracy
F:Skepticalof
markets
G:Ethnic
identity
H:National
identity
I:Attitudesabout
environment
J:Political
behavior
K:Avoidrisky
investment
L:Cooperation
withminority
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
P
an
el
A
:P
ar
en
ts
’
C
C
P
m
em
be
rs
hi
p
N
ew
C
u
rr
ic
u
lu
m
0.
23
2
0.
12
2
0.
27
5
0.
23
9
0.
03
8
0.
10
2
0.
04
7
0.
08
7
-0
.1
67
0.
14
1
0.
09
7
0.
02
9
[0
.1
06
]
[0
.0
89
]
[0
.0
88
]
[0
.1
06
]
[0
.0
40
]
[0
.0
47
]
[0
.1
15
]
[0
.0
81
]
[0
.1
22
]
[0
.1
03
]
[0
.0
90
]
[0
.0
37
]
P
ar
en
ts
C
C
P
m
em
b
er
s
-0
.1
00
-0
.0
30
0.
14
7
0.
27
5
-0
.0
47
-0
.0
38
-0
.0
82
0.
04
0
-0
.0
95
0.
18
9
-0
.3
54
0.
05
0
[0
.0
88
]
[0
.0
95
]
[0
.0
76
]
[0
.0
77
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
43
]
[0
.1
04
]
[0
.0
68
]
[0
.1
02
]
[0
.0
68
]
[0
.0
91
]
[0
.0
25
]
N
ew
C
u
rr
ic
u
lu
m
×
0.
02
4
0.
06
7
-0
.1
04
-0
.1
19
0.
01
6
-0
.0
28
0.
02
7
-0
.0
58
0.
00
6
-0
.1
02
0.
18
9
-0
.0
47
P
ar
en
ts
C
C
P
m
em
b
er
s
[0
.0
99
]
[0
.1
14
]
[0
.0
95
]
[0
.0
96
]
[0
.0
39
]
[0
.0
51
]
[0
.1
21
]
[0
.0
77
]
[0
.1
23
]
[0
.0
89
]
[0
.1
03
]
[0
.0
32
]
P
an
el
B
:R
ar
el
y
ac
qu
ir
e
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
fr
om
fo
re
ig
n
w
eb
si
te
s
N
ew
C
u
rr
ic
u
lu
m
0.
24
2
0.
22
1
0.
16
0
0.
13
5
0.
04
5
0.
11
6
0.
02
9
-0
.0
11
-0
.1
00
0.
12
1
0.
19
9
0.
01
9
[0
.1
03
]
[0
.0
76
]
[0
.0
85
]
[0
.1
05
]
[0
.0
42
]
[0
.0
44
]
[0
.0
99
]
[0
.0
89
]
[0
.1
14
]
[0
.1
06
]
[0
.0
98
]
[0
.0
36
]
R
ar
el
y
fo
re
ig
n
w
eb
si
te
s
0.
18
3
0.
15
4
-0
.0
12
-0
.1
24
0.
01
8
0.
11
1
-0
.0
60
0.
06
0
0.
20
1
-0
.0
68
0.
21
5
-0
.0
39
[0
.0
75
]
[0
.0
84
]
[0
.0
71
]
[0
.0
96
]
[0
.0
49
]
[0
.0
41
]
[0
.1
05
]
[0
.0
61
]
[0
.0
82
]
[0
.0
74
]
[0
.0
86
]
[0
.0
27
]
N
ew
C
u
rr
ic
u
lu
m
×
0.
01
1
-0
.1
27
0.
11
2
0.
06
0
0.
00
7
-0
.0
58
0.
07
0
0.
13
7
-0
.1
34
-0
.0
83
0.
01
5
-0
.0
36
R
ar
el
y
fo
re
ig
n
w
eb
si
te
s
[0
.0
97
]
[0
.1
04
]
[0
.0
89
]
[0
.1
13
]
[0
.0
57
]
[0
.0
50
]
[0
.1
22
]
[0
.0
73
]
[0
.0
97
]
[0
.1
05
]
[0
.1
01
]
[0
.0
34
]
P
an
el
C
:P
re
di
ct
ed
tr
u
st
in
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
of
fi
ci
al
s
(a
bo
ve
m
ed
ia
n
)
N
ew
C
u
rr
ic
u
lu
m
0.
23
9
0.
15
4
0.
20
8
0.
15
8
0.
02
3
0.
12
9
0.
06
6
0.
02
3
-0
.1
96
0.
03
7
0.
20
2
0.
00
4
[0
.1
06
]
[0
.0
75
]
[0
.0
87
]
[0
.1
10
]
[0
.0
39
]
[0
.0
43
]
[0
.0
79
]
[0
.0
93
]
[0
.1
07
]
[0
.1
00
]
[0
.0
89
]
[0
.0
38
]
P
re
d
ic
te
d
tr
u
st
in
g
o
v
t.
0.
16
9
0.
04
1
0.
05
0
-0
.1
61
-0
.0
56
0.
16
9
0.
10
2
-0
.0
40
0.
06
7
-0
.3
14
0.
25
4
-0
.0
49
[0
.1
17
]
[0
.1
14
]
[0
.1
01
]
[0
.0
97
]
[0
.0
43
]
[0
.0
52
]
[0
.0
90
]
[0
.0
79
]
[0
.0
94
]
[0
.0
86
]
[0
.1
08
]
[0
.0
37
]
N
ew
C
u
rr
ic
u
lu
m
×
0.
02
1
0.
01
8
0.
01
3
0.
02
4
0.
06
7
-0
.1
16
-0
.0
03
0.
07
8
0.
08
6
0.
12
0
0.
01
0
-0
.0
05
P
re
d
ic
te
d
tr
u
st
in
g
o
v
t.
[0
.1
20
]
[0
.1
22
]
[0
.1
12
]
[0
.1
10
]
[0
.0
50
]
[0
.0
56
]
[0
.1
03
]
[0
.0
90
]
[0
.1
08
]
[0
.1
07
]
[0
.1
10
]
[0
.0
40
]
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
1,
76
5
1,
73
3
1,
72
4
1,
60
3
1,
72
4
1,
62
5
1,
80
3
1,
70
2
1,
70
8
1,
69
8
1,
69
8
1,
69
8
M
ea
n
D
V
0
0
0
0
0.
39
2
0.
69
8
0
3.
54
2
0
0
0
0.
84
2
S
td
.D
ev
.D
V
1
1
1
1
0.
48
8
0.
45
9
1
0.
71
7
1
1
1
0.
36
5
A
ll
p
an
el
s
ad
d
to
o
u
r
b
as
el
in
e
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
th
e
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
b
et
w
ee
n
an
in
d
ic
at
o
r
v
ar
ia
b
le
an
d
th
e
N
ew
C
u
rr
ic
u
lu
m
d
u
m
m
y
v
ar
ia
b
le
,
p
lu
s
th
e
m
ai
n
ef
fe
ct
o
f
th
e
in
d
ic
at
o
r.
In
P
an
el
A
,
th
e
in
d
ic
at
o
r
is
eq
u
al
to
1
if
at
le
as
t
o
n
e
o
f
th
e
st
u
d
en
t’
s
p
ar
en
ts
w
as
a
m
em
b
er
o
f
th
e
C
h
in
es
e
C
o
m
m
u
n
is
t
P
ar
ty
.
In
P
an
el
B
,t
h
e
in
d
ic
at
o
r
is
eq
u
al
to
1
if
a
st
u
d
en
t
re
p
o
rt
ed
o
b
ta
in
in
g
n
ew
s
fr
o
m
fo
re
ig
n
w
eb
si
te
s
le
ss
th
an
o
n
ce
p
er
m
o
n
th
.
In
P
an
el
C
,
th
e
in
d
ic
at
o
r
is
eq
u
al
to
1
if
a
st
u
d
en
t’
s
p
re
d
ic
te
d
le
v
el
o
f
tr
u
st
(b
as
ed
o
n
b
ac
k
g
ro
u
n
d
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s)
w
as
ab
o
v
e
th
e
m
ed
ia
n
.
A
ll
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
in
cl
u
d
e
a
fu
ll
se
t
o
f
p
ro
v
in
ce
an
d
co
h
o
rt
fi
x
ed
ef
fe
ct
s
(n
o
t
re
p
o
rt
ed
).
R
o
b
u
st
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
b
ra
ck
et
s,
cl
u
st
er
ed
at
th
e
p
ro
v
in
ce
×
co
h
o
rt
le
v
el
.
A.64
T
ab
le
G
.1
4:
W
ei
g
h
te
d
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
D
ep
en
d
en
t
v
ar
ia
b
le
:
A:Trustin
govt.officials
B:Bribery
andcivic-
mindedness
C:Perception
ofChinese
democracy
D:Wisdomof
themasses
E:Characteristics
ofdemocracy
F:Skepticalof
markets
G:Ethnic
identity
H:National
identity
I:Attitudesabout
environment
J:Political
behavior
K:Avoidrisky
investment
L:Cooperation
withminority
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
N
ew
C
u
rr
ic
u
lu
m
0.
26
2
0.
21
9
0.
18
8
0.
16
1
0.
06
9
0.
08
3
0.
01
8
0.
06
7
-0
.1
55
0.
04
2
0.
17
7
-0
.0
13
[0
.0
87
]
[0
.0
66
]
[0
.0
66
]
[0
.0
92
]
[0
.0
34
]
[0
.0
46
]
[0
.0
73
]
[0
.0
95
]
[0
.1
02
]
[0
.0
96
]
[0
.0
75
]
[0
.0
31
]
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
1,
76
5
1,
73
3
1,
72
4
1,
60
3
1,
72
4
1,
62
5
1,
80
3
1,
70
2
1,
70
8
1,
69
8
1,
69
8
1,
69
8
M
ea
n
D
V
0
0
0
0
0.
39
2
0.
69
8
0
3.
54
2
0
0
0
0.
84
2
S
td
.D
ev
.D
V
1.
91
0
1.
77
7
1.
09
7
1.
35
7
0.
48
8
0.
45
9
1.
20
2
0.
71
7
1.
14
1
1.
17
8
1.
09
4
0.
36
5
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
w
ei
g
h
ts
u
se
d
ar
e
th
e
in
v
er
se
su
rv
ey
re
sp
o
n
se
ra
te
s,
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
b
y
p
ro
v
in
ce
×
co
h
o
rt
ce
ll
.
A
ll
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
in
cl
u
d
e
a
fu
ll
se
t
o
f
p
ro
v
in
ce
an
d
co
h
o
rt
fi
x
ed
ef
fe
ct
s
(n
o
t
re
p
o
rt
ed
).
R
o
b
u
st
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
b
ra
ck
et
s,
cl
u
st
er
ed
at
th
e
p
ro
v
in
ce
×
co
h
o
rt
le
v
el
(1
16
cl
u
st
er
s)
.
A.65
